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ABSTRACT
Water flow-ing in streams has value for various types of
recreati'onists. Increasing instream flows from low levels may
enhance the recreational experience for ftshermen~ white water
enthusiasts and shoreline recreationists. Increasing instream flows
in arid and semi-arid conditions may be tn conflict with established
withdrawal uses, for irrigation, industri~s and households. Instream
flows have a public or collective good character~ such that market
prices are not observable. Estimating marginal values for instream
flow which are commensurate wi th those, for wi thdrawa1 uses presents
well-known difficul ti:es..
Following recently developed techniques for estimating the value
of public goods, an interative bi,dding game was administered in 1978
to a sample of recreationists. using a Colorado mountain stream to
determi,ne thei,r wi,llingness to pay' for alternative rates of flow.
Regression techniques were applied and the results were used to
est i,mate the marginal val ue of instream flows for each month of the
recreation season. The stati:s:tical reltafJtltty of the estimates was
more than adequate, indicating the tecfmtque is suitable for aiding
in instream flow management dectsJons.
Contents of this publication do not necessarily reflect the views and
policies of the Office of Water Research and Technology~ U.S. Department
of the Interior, nor does mention of trade names or commercial products
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Farmers, mine operators, cities, and towns in Colorado have appro-
priated and developed the State's water resources since 1850. Unable
to depend on rainfall in Colorado's semi-arid environment, they recog-
nized that diverting water away from the natural stream channel would
substantially increase their production possibilities. Even though
withdrawal water uses (irrigation, household, and industrial) divert
stream flow into the production of goods and services, many now believe
that instream water uses (recreation and environmental quality) have an
economic value large enough to warrant instream flow management strate-
gies. However, major conflicts exist between withdrawal and instream
water resources, since water in one capacity generally precludes its
use in the other. This research first attempts to place an economic
value on instream uses, then presents the economic and legal factors
associated with different minimum flow management strategies.
Colorado's decision, early in its development as a state, to adopt
water institutions that completely allocated water into crop produc-
tion, mineral extraction, and domestic uses was economically wise.
Instream flow water resources were abundant in relation to the amount
farmers, miners, and towns could use. Stream recreation and aesthetic
experiences were readily available compared with the urgent need and
small supply of stream flow as production inputs. Diverting water flow
away from the river transferred abundant water resources, having at the
2
margin only a small economic recreational value, into uses having a
very large marginal value.
Many water resource planners still hold the belief that water in
its natural state has no value, and resist any change away from the
existing allocation institutions that are biased toward water resource
development. Market forces direct water flow into withdrawal uses
where the economic return to water is known and understood. Since out-
door water recreation developed as a non-marketed good, instream flow
for recreation use is not subject to the same marginal prices as in
withdrawal use, and appears as a free input in relation to other water
uses. Granted, we may not want the market to allocate free-flowing
stream recreation, but that doesn't mean instream water resources for
that use have zero economic value.
Other individuals, even though they recognize water in the
instream has value, often argue that economic analysis cannot possibly
quantify the social value. The experience, generating personal and
aesthetic pleasures, may be difficult to value, but the notion that
economic value can't account for similar experiences is misleading.
The economic market does a good job valuing a ticket to a Denver
Bronco football game, which is primarily an aesthetic and recreation
experience. Many marketed commodities have some degree of aesthetic
value, which can be effectively reflected by market exchanges. This
report takes the position that instream flow value for recreation is
fully equivalent with the economic value of those resources in crop
production. Due to the public good characteristic of instream flows,
the job imputing non-market economic values is difficult but not impos-
sible.
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Because many individuals believe either water left instream has
little value or economics cannot assist in determining recreation
value, Colorado's water allocation system continues to distribute water
into the production of goods and services, especially irrigated crop
production. The part market-part legal water allocation has driven
water's marginal value in crop production very low. At the same time,
rapid population growth has increased water diversions for household
and industrial activities. Future energy development might also
require large water diversions. But equally important, growing income,
leisure time, and mobility has broadened interest in instream flows for
recreation. Instream flow provides direct utility to recreationists
and indirect returns to Colorado's major tourist industry. How can
resource managers satisfy all these water customers?
Colorado responded to these changing water demands by passing
minimum flow legislation. l The federal government, also concerned
about maintaining environmental instream flow benefits, responded with
the Wild and Scenic River Act. 2 But, before governmental agencies can
formulate appropriate stream flow management policies, they need defen-
sible instream flow value estimates. Even though instream flow valua-
tion may be difficult, rational and informed decision making requires
specific and complete information about water's marginal value in all
uses. This paper, focusing on instream flow valuation, should help the
water resource manager answer questions concerning the optimal instream
flow level.
'Wayne Nelson, Gerry Horak, and Martin Lewis, IIInstream Flow
Strategies for Colorado," Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. Department of
the Interior, FHS/OBS-78/37 (May 1978), p. 12.
2Ibid ., p. 25.
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Background
Even though withdrawal and instream users compete for water on
most streams in Colorado, conflicts are especially evident in the
Poudre River Canyon. As early as 1860, private companies began build-
ing irrigation canals providing water to land not adjacent to the
Poudre River. The appropriation doctrine provided the framework to
allocate water to irrigation companies. This legal institution allo-
cates river flow by use and priority. Any individual with a beneficial
water use (including household, irrigation, power, recreation, etc.)
may apply for and receive a water right. Whenever appropriations on a
stream exceed water supplies, each irrigator receives water based on
his temporal priority. Farmers with senior water rights having the
highest priority (earliest application date) divert water first, fol-
lowed by junior irrigators having later application dates. This allo-
cation system guarantees legal security to irrigators with senior water
rights.
By 1900, irrigation companies and cities fully appropriated the
stream flow in the study area, the Poudre River Canyon. Colorado water
courts had decreed over 4,000 cubic feet per second direct flow rights
to irrigators alone, even though the Poudre River seldom has instream
flows exceeding 2,000 cfs. 3 None of the water rights have instream
flow maintenance as their stated beneficial use. On any given summer
day, irrigators could totally divert stream flows away from the Poudre
River.
3A. Maass and R. L. Anderson, ... And the Desert Shall Rejoice
Conflict, Growth, and Justice in Arid Environments (Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 1978), p. 281.
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Besides providing irrigation water~ the Poudre River Canyon is an
extremely attractive recreation site. During spring and early summer~
certain river reaches form white water rapids that any kayaker or
rafter can enjoy. By late summer~ the stream flow drops low enough to
support an excellent trout fishery. The National Forest Service even
designated parts of the Poudre River as II wi1d trout ll fishing sections
for fly or lure fishermen. In addition~ over 100~000 recreationists
visited the Poudre Canyon to enjoy non-water contact activities,
including camping, viewing~ hiking, picnicking~ etc.
Even though water allocation problems affect the entire Poudre
River, they are especially troublesome throughout the lowest 30 stream
miles where conflicts arise between recreationists, wanting the flow to
remain instream, and farmers, diverting the water for crop production.
The economic theory of optimal resource allocation supplies a framework
for resolving these conflicts. The object is to distribute stream flow
between competing users in order to produce the greatest social bene-
fit. The operational criterion calls for reallocating stream flow
until the marginal return in all uses is equal. Young and Gray4 pre-
sent substantial evidence on the marginal value of water in withdrawal
uses. The research in this paper estimates the instream flow marginal
value in the production of recreation and aesthetic experiences.
Although stream recreation obviously requires water f10w~
researchers have budgeted little time or effort into instream flow
valuation. Instead, they have studied the instream flow requirements
to sustain different levels of fishing, white water, or other
4R. A. Young and S. L. Gray, Economic Value of Water: Concepts
and Empirical Estimates, Final Report to the National Water Commission,
Report No. NWC-SBS-72-047, March 1972.
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free-flowing recreation, or they have ordina11y ranked and quantified
streams and stream recreation. 5,6 An extensive literature search
didn't reveal any published study that unequivocally places an economic
value on instream flow commensurate vJith values generated by more
familiar market mechanisms.
The recent economic studies valuating different environmental
improvements provides theoretical direction. In 1974, Randall, et ~.7
estimated the economic benefits from air quality improvements in the
Four Corners Region (southwestern United States). Brookshire, et ~.,8
following Randall's study, placed an economic value on aesthetic dam-
ages from additional coal-fired power plants in the Four Corners
Region. Hammack and Brown,9 later Randall and Brookshire,lO estab-
1ished economic values for wildlife in a recreational experience.
Although these studies impute synthetic resource values, they deal with
substantially different environmental problems. The most relevant
5Ronald Hyra, Methods of Assessing Instream Flows for Recreation,
Instream Flow Information Paper No.6, Cooperative Instream Flow
Service Group, Fort Collins, Colorado, June 1978.
6E. L. Micha1son, IIAn Attempt to Quantify the Esthetics of Wild
and Scenic Rivers in Idaho,1I River Recreation Management and Research
Symposium, USDA, Forest Service, January 1977.
7Alan Randall, Berry Ives, and Clyde Eastman, "Bidding Games for
Valuation of Aesthetic Environmental Improvements," Journal of Environ-
mental Economics and Management (1974).
8David S. Brookshire, Berry C. Ives, and William D. Schulze, liThe
Valuation of Aesthetic Preferences," Journal of Environmental Economics
and Management (1976).
9Judd Hammack and Gardner Brown, Waterfowl and Wetlands: Toward
Bioeconomic Analysis, Resources For The Future (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1974). .
10Alan Randall and David S. Brookshire, "public Policy, Public
Goods and Contingent Valuation Mechanisms," Staff Paper 68, University
of Kentucky, Lexington, June 1978.
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study valued water quality improvements i:n the. S:outfi Platte Rfver
11Basin, Colorado.
Objectives
This research paper has two major objecti:ves. Following the recent
advances in environmental economics valuing afr, water, and wildlife
inputs i'nto aesthetic experiences, the first objective. ts to estimate
instream fl OWl S margina1 val ue for wate.r-bas:ed recreation. As with the
other environmental resources, instream flows have public good attributes
that discourage private market all ocat i'on systems~ In the absence of
market pri'ces:, thjs paper inputes synthetic i:nstre.am flow social values
comparab1e and commensutate wi th those. values: in wi:thdrawa1 uses.
The amount a recreat i oni.st is wi 11 tng to pay for al ternat lve flow'
levels represents tnstream flow·s economtc value.. Stream recreation
may depend on water flows, but dectsi:ons: concerning resource alloca-
tions' fnvol ve adding or subtracting small increments: to the exi's,ting
flow level.. Regardless of th.e largeaggre,gate value. many individuals
assign to stream re.creation experiences, e:acn pe.rson has, a 1fmtt on flow
much. they will give up to enjoy' small additions' to the instream flow'~.
The. appropriate. de.ci:ston...makj:ng val ue, corres'~on.dtng to ones in th.e
market economy·, is- the m<irgitia1 wtl1 tngness' to pay for instre'am flows' ..
The second obj ect lve. i.5; to pre.s;ent th.e e.conomi:c and 1ega1 factors
as'sociate.d w·i.th. developtn.g mtnimum flow' strate:gtes.. For ye.ars., water
al10cqti.on instituti.ons' encouraged diverti.ng wa,ter from the stre.am tnto
l1Rtchard G. Walsh, Douglas A. Greenley, Robert A•. Young, JohnR.
McKean, and Anthony A. Prato, OptionValue.s,p,reserva.ti:On·Va1ue.s'and
Recreat iona1 Benefits. of Improved" Water' QU&1tty, U. S~ Environmental
Protectton Agency, January 1978.
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crop production or household use. Today, many Coloradoans are willing
to sacrifice traditional water use outputs for more recreation ameni-
ties. Complete evaluation of decisions, changing instream flow levels,
requires analyzing the economic tradeof~associated with alternative
instream flow allocations and the legal institutio~structuring water
right distributions.
Economic theory, alone, may lead to inappropriate minimum flow
strategies unless the policy maker considers the legal regulations.
How can water planners allocate instream flow between conflicting needs
to produce the greatest social benefits becomes the economic question.
Ignoring any intemporal problems, the traditional static rule for
social benefit optimization calls for an allocation where the instream
flow marginal return in all uses is the same. 12 But, economic solu-
tions interact with the legal water rights regulations. Various water
right laws may lead to different actual water allocations and different
perceptions about the optimal water allocation. 13 Looking only at the
economic concepts and information clarifies many issues, but unneces-
sarily limits any policy recommendations.
Procedures
This research uses a contingent valuation approach (direct con-
sumer surplus technique) to estimate the recreationist's willingness to
pay for instream flows. The inverse demand function is:
12J . Hirshleifer, J. C. DeHaven and J. W. Milliman, Water Supply
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960).
130. w. Bromley, IIproperty Rules, Liability Rules, and Environ-
mental Economics,1I Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 12, No. 1 (r~arch
1978) .
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WTP = g(Flow, Income, Tastes).
The quantity variable, flow, representing the stream's discharge in
cubic feet per second units models the changes in stream depth and
velocity. At different sites, a given flow in the river may generate
different depths and velocities depending on that site's physical con-
figuration. But, flow rather than depth or velocity remains the pri-
mary economic quantity variable, since water managers can alter flow
levels easier than changing the stream's contour.
D. F. Bradford formulated the theoretical base for contingent
valuation methods. 14 The object is to trace out an aggregate
willingness-to-pay function modeling an individual's ranking of alter-
native consumption bundles that differ with respect to the instream
flow level and income. These bid functions have the same economic
meaning as ordinary indifference curves. The slope measures the mar-
ginal substitution rate between income and instream flow levels.
According to Bradford, the maximum bid responses for all instream flow
levels models a total instream flow benefit curve having a first
derivative equal to the marginal benefit function, otherwise known as
a compensated demand curve. 15
The contingent valuation technique, in this paper, uses a personal
survey that solicits direct responses from recreationist about the
maximum price he would pay for an increase in the flow level rather
than do without. A hypothetical instream flow market forces the
recreationist to choose between his need for instream flow and other
140. F. Bradford, "Benefit-Cost Analysis and Demand Curves for
Public GOOdS,1I Kyklos 23 (1970).
l5 Ibid .
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expenditures. Thus, the willingness-to-pay survey resembles the actual
market place, where the individual confronted with a range of commodi-
ties decides whether to buy or not to buy.
A well-constructed survey increases the reliability of the responses.
The iterative bidding game survey included:
1. Color photographs showing eight different instream flow levels
at four different sites. The photographs reduced the respondent1s need
to image the appearance of the Poudre River at each flow level, thus pro-
viding a uniform comparison base.
2. Hydrologic and fishery data on the Poudre River's depth,
velocity, and fishing success at each flow level. This information
caputred the non-visual stream changes for each instream flow.
3. Two detailed market situations forcing each respondent to
visualize paying either an entrance fee or sales tax to use the instream
flow. Both payment vehicles confronted the respondent with familiar
public financial obligations.
4. Bidding game willingness-to-pay questions, where the enumer-
ator iteratively increases the instream flow fee or sales tax until the
respondent indicates his maximum payment for a specific change in the
flow level.
Even though the hypothetical bidding game format may have responses
different from actual behavior, a well-designed survey should minimize
any bias.
A personal fntervi'ew provided the wi'll ingness... to-pay val ues. Any
househo1d visi't ing the Poudre Ri ver, during the 1978 SUrmle,r, was a
potencial member of the sample population. The survey design separated
instream recreationists into fishing, shoreline, and white water
11
activity groups. Fishing recreation included fly, lure, and bait
fishermen. The shoreline group included stream-related activities
(camping, hiking, viewing, etc.). The white-water class included
tubing, kayaking, and rafting experiences. To insure a random sample,
interviews took place on randomly selected days during each summer
month. Although the sample sizes were relatively small (49 fishermen,
45 shoreliners, and 40 white water recreationists), the sample charac-
teristics generally reflected recreationist socio-economic characteris-
tics.
Special Issues
Willingness-to-pay questions in the instream flow bidding game
attempted to measure only the direct recreation user benefits. The
research in this paper omits consideration of preservation values or
congestion effects. Krutilla pointed out that certain environmental
resources may have option, existence, and bequest benefits separate
from recreationist's immediate willingness to pay.16 Option value rep-
resents the extra amount recreationists would pay to preserve non-
reproduceable environmental resources. Existence value measures the
benefit individuals receive from the knowledge that he can at any time
use the resource. And bequest value represents the individual's
utility from preserving the environmental resource for future genera-
tions.
These non-user benefits may be very large for certain irreplace-
able natural resources. For example, individuals are probably willing
l6John V.Krutilla and Anthony C. Fisher, The Economics of Natural
Environments, Resources For The Future (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1975).
12
to pay a great deal for the option, existence, and bequest benefits
from the Grand Canyon. The key feature is irreversibility; no known
technology exists that can reproduce the scenic beauty of the Grand
Canyon. Decisions concerning irreversible actions must take into
account any possible non-user benefits.
Alternative stream flow allocations do not meet Krutilla's defini-
tion of an irreversible decision. l ? Complete stream flow diversion
into crop production eliminates any recreational or aesthetic uses of
the Poudre River only for one period. Should that decision prove
wrong, resource managers can restore the recreational services in the
next year by maintaining instream flow levels and reintroducing trout.
The costs may be relatively large, but the decision is not irreversi-
ble. Since preservation benefits are expected to be minor, I did not
attempt to explicitly measure their magnitude.
The willingness-to-pay equation does not account for the dis-
utility associated with congested recreation areas. After some thresh-
old, each additional user reduces the satisfaction from an instream
flow recreation experience. To the extent a change in the instream
flow level, improving the recreation experience, also attracts more
users the estimated value overstates the true value. The congestion
problem is important when comparing decisions concerning instream flow
for low density or high density recreation. For example, fishing is a
relatively low-attendance but high-value use; while, shoreline activi-
ties represent a high-attendance low-value use. Both the physical
recreation differences and the lower congestion levels make fishing a
higher value use. But, water resource decisions on the Poudre River
l7 Ibid ., p. 12.
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are not between different recreation activities, rather between water
allocations to withdrawal uses or recreation services. I assume that
the existing participation rate won't change as water managers allocate
water from irrigation to recreation or vice versa.
Study Plan
This study is divided into three interdependent sections. The
next section, Chapter 2)discusses the economic framework for water
resource valuation and the economic techniques estimatjrig" non-market
instream flow benefits. Then, Chapter 4 and 5 deal with the data col-
lection and statistical estimation of instream flow benefits. The
last section, Chapter 5, evaluates different instream flow allocation
strategtes. Chapter 6 sunmari zes the maj or findi"ngs, concl us ions,
and recommendations.
CHAPTER 2
MODELING NON-MARKET INSTREAM FLetA[ BENEFITS: CONCEPTUALIZATION
Water allocations for free-flowing stream recreation activities occur
outside the familiar market system. Even though individuals in Colorado can
buy and sell water rights, the collective good aspect of instream flow--more
flow for one recreationi'st means more. flow for all participants--inhi bi ts
transactions between private water right owners and individuals wanting
stream flow for recreation. In the absence of mark.et prices, the re-
searcher must estimate a surrogate value, a "shadow price," to represent
the social worth of instream flows. Water manager's can use these synthetic
benefit estimates as they evaluate alternative stream flow' investment
decisions and fnstream flow allocation strategies.
Thi s chapter di.scusse.s th.e conceptual tzati'on of an appropr; ate measure
of th.e. benefits that recreation; sts rece; ve. as they' use instream flows,
and outl ines the technique used to meas:ure instream flow value. The ap-
proach, termed a "contingent valuation method ll estimates a total instream
flow bid function that value.s the benefits' over and above actual expend-
iture.s on the recreation experience. Si.nce th.is: report attempts to value
incremental instream flow chan.ges', the e.conomtc guide is marginal net
oenefits.
Will ingne.ss to' Pay as a· Measure' of·' Economic Va 1ue
In the market place tile commodi.ty prtce r,ef1 ects economi c exchange
value. Market price, under ce.rtain circumstances, measures the marginal
util ity the indivtdual rece.ive.s from the last uni.t consumed. Dtffere:nces
in coml1Jodi,ty pri.ces., assumi,ng that the effects of variation in user income
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those expenditures shouldn1t be imputed to changes in the stream flow alone.
A1so, some expenditures provide uti'l i ty di'rectly to the user, even though
he doesn't participate. Even if instream flows were eliminated, the rec-
reationist could enjoy a benefit from a new expenditure pattern equal to
the benefit from the original expenditure on stream recreation. The net
benefit, willingness to pay for instream flows, is the incremental increase
in uti'l i ty over and above the actual expenditure.
Figure 1 ill ustrates the important features of tne i'nstream flow
valuati'on problem. The total beneftt function1s first derivative, d'(F),
represents the aggregate marginal benefit curve for fnstream flow. For
changes in the existing instream flow, the approprtate measure of the
socia1 worth. is margfna1 benefi't, rather than total instream flow benef; ts.
The curve, c l (F), sh.ows the individual's own private marginal expenditure
on equipment and other inputs he needs in order to enjoy the benefits
from different instream flow quantities. Th.e corrmunity also bears a cost
to supply instream flows. The curve, k t (Fl, reflects 50th the marginal
public cost to provide instream flows, and the marginal social opportunity
cost of having the water flowing in the stream versus being diverted or
stored for other productive uses. For example, managing stream flow at
htghe.r levels precludes diverting water for trri'gated crop production.
Th.e social opportunity cost fs equal to the decrease in farm benefits due
to less irri'gation water s·upply. Optimal i,nstream flow quantity occurs
at point E, (.F* 1, in Pigure 1, where net will ;ngness to pay ;s equal to















Techniques to measure instream flow benefits either estimate the
willingness-to-pay function, d'CF}, over the appropriate range of flow
levels, or they directly estimate the opti,mal flow level. The gross ex-
penditure method and the faci 1i ti'es cost approach try to estimate poi nt
E. The indiVidual's own expenditures for the instream recreation activity
is' th_e gross expenditure benefit estimate. This approach assures that the
recreation experience is at 1east worth the, tndtvtdualls expenditure on
travel, equipment and daily area expenses. The quantity of instream flow
provision is at poi'nt F1. These expenditures measure the util ity derived
from the purchase of i terns and may contri'bute to the util i ty of recreati'on
experi'ence, but that estimate: has little, to say about tfle gain i'n utility
due to increased instream flow'. 2
2Jack Knetsch and Robert K. Davi's, IIComparisons of Methods for Recreation
Evaluation," Allen Kneese and Stephen Smith, ed., Water Research (Baltimore:
John Hopkins Press, 1966). '
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The cost method values instream flow benefits as the least cost method
of providing more flow. Instream flow provision would be at point F2•
This method has the limitation that one can justify any recreational ex-
penditure--benefits always equal cost--wi'thout knowing anything about the
opportunity cost of public expenditures in some other use or anything about
th.e decrease (increase) in recreation util i'ty from lower (higher) instream
flow levels. 3 Because these techniques don't satisfy theoretical economic
requirements, most economi'sts find them inappropriate. The correct instream
flow value is the amount recreationists are willing to pay to enjoy an
incremental increase in the stream flow 1evel.
Contingent Valuation Approach
TEte contingent valuati:on method uses: personal or mai'l interviews to
make straight forward estimates of the recreationist's' will ingness to pay
for instream flows. Correctly formulated s'ample survey solicitsindividual
or househ.o ld responses about the maximum pri'ce the recreationist waul d pay
for a speciftc recreati'on input, rather tflan do witnout. Intui'tively,
the indivtdual makes' util tty maximizing choice.s concerning his time and
expenses. to enjoy' a recreatton activity. If the recreation experience, or
in thts report a recreation input, had a mark.et price, ttie indi'vidual woul d
choose betwe,en the need for the recreation input to the experience and
oth.e:r expendi:tures.. The 'interview' provides the tool for determining the
synthetic price he woul d be will ing to pay' i,f the, recreation opportunity
were marketed.
This technique effectively aids water resource management. An appro-
priately worded questtonnaire values tEte net contri'bution of the recreation
input to the experience. The approach can easily focus. on the incremental
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illustrates a set of hypothetical individual bidfunctions~·. The vertical
axis represents negative changes in a numerairegood (usual1yin.terms of
the recreationist's dollar income); the horizontal axis represents positive
changes in the stream flow level. The researcher constructs these curves
by asking the household to estimate his maximum bid, in terms of the num-




Figure 2. The Bradford Public Good Vqluqtion Model~
Source: Randall and Brookshire, 1978.
yO income and FO instream flow, if the household has a positive preference
for both the numeraire and instream flow, the curve SO' represents one
Bradford bid function. At point A, the individual's maximum bid to have
stream flow level, Fl , is equal to the distance O.B. The curve passes
through the origin since he would not give up income if the instream flow
level does not increase. Constructing an instream flow indifference bid
curve is the hypothetical bidding game's objective. The researcher may
ask survey participants either a willingness-to-pay (WTP) or willingness-
to-accept compensation (WTA) question to generate an indifference bid curve. 13
l3Randall and Brookshire, Ope cit.
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Either wi11ingness-to-pay question relating to a specific Hicksian consumer
surplus can be a compensation or equivilent welfare measure. The questions
differ with respect to the initial instream flow and income endownment,
with respect to the water property rights, and with respect to the direction
of instream flow change. Assume that the recreationist has no rights to
any stream flow. Given the initial endowment (yO, Fa) in Figure 2, the
WTP compensating surplus questions the recreationist about his maximum bid
to obtain an increase instream flow to F2. That payment, equal to the
distance DB, leaves the household on his initial indifference curve, SO'
with less income but more intream flow. If the initial endowment is yO,Fl,
the answer to a WTP equivalent surplus question reveals the maximum payment
to avoid a decrease in stream flow to Fl. This compensation (OB) leaves
the household on his subsequent indifference curve So instead of 51' at
point A.
Now, provide the recreationist an instream flow property right of
Fl. If the initial endowment is at yO, F1, the appropriate equivalent
surplus bidding game asks the household about its maximum willingness to
accept the lower stream flow, FO; and if the initial endo~ffient is at
point A the WTAC compensation surplus measures the income the household
needs in order to voluntarily accept the lower instream flow at Fa.
Summarizing these relationships, then:
where Mis the Marsha1lian consumer surplus. One very important question
concerns the relationship between WTP, WTAC and M. According to Randall
and Stoll 14
l4Alan Randall and John Stoll, "Consumer Surplus in Commodity Space,"
working paper, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Kentucky,
Lexington, Kentuck.y, 1978.
CHAPTER 3
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS PROCEDURES
Direct consumer surplus estimation, more than any other empirical
study, demands a specific problem area, appropriate sample selection,
careful survey instrument formulation, and proper statistical models.
The Poudre River Canyon is an ideal study location. Although, it may
be too small to permit generalizations of the results to Eastern riv-
ers, it does illustrate Western water allocation problems where over-
appropriation is the basic problem. Currently, those who divert the
stream flow have rights to the total water supply, regardless of the
water's instream recreation value. The outstanding recreation possi-
bilities in the Poudre River Canyon emphasize the economic allocation
problem, thus reduce the bidding game abstraction. Similarly, a well
constructed sample survey can help make the bidding game results more
believable. Color photographs and recognizable payment vehicles place
the respondent into a familiar economic situation. Choosing the cor-
rect statistical model is especially difficult. Economic theory
suggests a rarige of possibilities each have advantages and dis-
advantages.
The Study Area
The study area includes the Cache la Poudre River Canyon from the
intersection with the eastern boundary of the Roosevelt National
Forest, just northeast of Fort Collins, Colorado, up to the river's





















1975 306 1459 1283 281 100
1974 1282 1816 601 107 79
1973 1454 2074 1066 372 63
1972 586 1445 413 84 105
1971 1014 2381 919 217 161
1970 962 1828 910 280 105
1969 822 1248 580 112 126
1968 469 1728 666 330 113
1967 428 1275 706 116 70
1966 485 561 158 102 99
1965 526 2180 1260 415 129
1964 583 1106 512 176 75
1963 444 635 199. 190 124
1962 1121 1427 748 184 37
1961 1142 1963 520 305 196
Average
for Years 775 1542 703 218 105
1961-1975
(Standard (361) (529 ). (338) (107) (401Deviation)
Source: U.S. Department of the Interior Water Resources Data for Colorado
(1961-1975) (observations are for canyon mouth gauge)
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Approximately five miles above the canyon mouth the Poudre River splits
into the main stem and the north fork. When the stream runoff is high,
this short section provides an excellent white water rapids for kayak-
ers and river rafters at all skill levels. Throughout the next 30 miles,
until one reaches the small town of Rustic, Colorado, the river makes
numerous twists and turns in an increasingly narrow canyon. The U.S.
Forest Service has built three picnic grounds and four campgrounds at places
where the canyon wides sl ightly. Excellent fishing abounds i'n this section,
with part of the river designated a IIwild-trout" fishing stretch for fly
or lure fishermen. The District Forest Ranger estimates that this lower
reach. receives 60 to 70 percent of the total recreation use. 1
Above Rustic, the river flows through a relatively broad mountain
canyon. Although this stretch is unquestionably b.eautiful much of it is
privately owned. Thus, there are two picnic sports and only one campground.
The highest few miles, where the stream leaves the highway and is accessible
only by foot, provides an excellent high mountai'n backpacking trail. The
low-flow problem effects the whole Poudre Canyon, but it ;s most important
in the lowest 30 miles, from Rustic down to the canyon mouth, where con-
flicts arise between recreationists wanting the flow for recreation and
farmers diverting the flow for crop irrigation.
The average instream flow (discharge) is relatively small, but the
flow- varies wtdely during the year and across years. The IS-year (1961-
19751 average flow was 248 cfs at Rustic, Colorado and 613 at the canyon
mouth. The maximum instream flow over that IS-year peri'od was 7,483 cfs,
during a flood, while the minimum was 10.3 cfs. The stream flow, during
IJames W. Carlson, District Ranger, Arapahoe and Roosevelt National
Forests, Port Collins, Colorado (September 1978).
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the year, also fluctuates from high flow in mid-June to low flow in
early spring and late summer (see Table 3-1).
The instream flow peak runoff depends on how rapidly the winter
snow accumulation melts. Spring rains and high temperatures in 1962
caused an early rise in the ream flow. Instream flow in June was much
lower than normal that year. The 1978 spring runoff was one of the
highest, peaking in mid-July at approximately 5,000 cfs and continuing
to have above average flow tnto August. Usually, the Poudre River has
approximately 700 cfs in July and 218 cfs in August.
In addition to snow melt, the Poudre River receives water from
seven transmountain diversions from the North Platte River drainage.
The average diversion between 1966-1970 was: 301 acre feet (af) from
the Cameron Pass and Michigan ditches, 1,980 af from the Skyline
ditch, 15,200 af from the Laramie-Poudre tunnel, and 2,430 af from the
Wilson supply ditch.
The Poudre River Canyon is an extremely popular recreation area.
In 1977, 146,500 people used the canyon for fishing, camping, kayaking,
etc. 2 A well maintained, surfaced highway parallels most of the river
channel. When the flow is high, the river provides white water rapids
for kayakers and rafters at all skill levels. The river and canyon,
with high, wooded mountains, form a picturesque mountain setting. In
fact, tne large majority of visttors c.ome: to the canyon just to relax
and enjoy the scenery, at one of the camp or pi.cnic grounds. For thos~e
2Recreational Information. Man~gement System, USDA, Forest Service:,
Fort Collins, Colorado, personal communication C1978}
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who do fi:sh~ the Poudre River temperature~ turbidity, and flow attrib-
utes produce an excel 1ent trout habi tate. The pri-mary speci"es are rain-
bow- and brown, with a"few brook and cutthroat (see Table 3-3). Table
3-3 s:hows: the Poudre Ri'ver recreational us-eo from 1971 to 1977.
Table 3-2. Recreation Use Rates for Fishing, Shoreline~ and White
Hater Activi"ties (no. annual visitor days - x 1,000).
Activity" 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
FishingA 18.7 20.6 20. 22. 26.3 37.5 39.5
Shore1i neB 120.2 140.6 123.0 137.2 145. 1 106.0 108.4
White waterC .2 .3 .5 .6 .7 .7 1.6
AF1y , 1ure ~ and bait trout fishermen.
BViewing, camping, hiking, picnicking, etc. activities.
CKayaking, rafting, tubing, canoeing.
Source: Recreational Information Management Service, U.S. Forest
Service, Fort Collins, Colorado (1977).
Farmers in the area have diverted Poudre River stream flow for
irrigation since 1864. They irrigate sugar beets, corn, beans,
alfalfa, and small grains on approximately 50,000 acres of land. Water
rights for irrigation have been decreed in excess of 4,000 cfs, much
less than the average summer runoff. The state is only now acquiring
water rights to maintain instream recr~ation activities.
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Table 3-3. Estimates of Brown and Rainbow Trout Populations in a
Campground and Wild Study Section of the Poudre River
(over 14 cm).
Mean Number Mean Number
Year Month Species Campground Wild Section
1971 Apri 1 Brown 163 133
Rainbow 208 198
Combined 371 331
Oct. Brown 217 180
Rainbow 233 229
Combined 450 409
1972 April Brown 123 159
Rainbow 184 184
Combined 307 343
Oct. Brown 213 207
Rainbow 231 189
Combined 444 396
Source: Thomas L. Marshall, "Trout Populations, Angler Harvest and
Value of Stocked and Unstocked Fisheries of the Cache la
Poudre River, Colorado," Ph.D. Thesis, Colorado State
University, Fort Collins, Colorado (June 1973), p. 56.
Sample Procedure
A complete measure of instream flow value would require interview-
ing all individuals who participated in stream recreation activities.
Without question, that task would be too expensive and time-consuming.
A simpler method selects only a few recreators then makes inferences
about all recreationists from the sample.
Any household visiting the Poudre River, during the 1978 summer,
was a potential member of the recreation sample population. The actual
sample included 134 persons who participated in fishing, shoreline, and
white water activities. The sample is estimated to represent .1 per-
cent of the fishermen, 2.5 percent of the white water recreationists,
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and .04 percent participants in shoreline recreation activities. The
sample survey design stratified the recreation population into the
three recreation activities, then selected a random sample from each
group.
One of the authors (Daubert) conducted the interviews.
Although this labor-intensive procedure increases the survey cost, it
also increases the response rate. Very few people refused to respond
when confronted in person. A high response rate reduces the possi-
bility of bias, since the sample should more closely resemble the
population. A personal interview is especially helpful in a hypo-
thetical bidding game situation, since the interviewer can note speci-
fic reactions and eliminate any misunderstanding about the questions in
the survey. But, the interviewer must always avoid interjecting his
own bias during the interview.
To lower the cost, the survey design separated instream recreation
activities i-nto fishing, shoreline, and white water groups and limited
the survey area. The most specific group was fishing, which included
fly, lure, and bait fishermen. The white water category included tub-
ing, kayaking, and rafting. The shoreline class represented all other
instream and stream-related activities such as camping, swimming, pic-
nicking, wading, hiking, viewing, etc. Because the shoreline group is
heterogeneous, one should use the results cautiously.
Only participants in the lower one-half of the study area, from
the canyon mouth to Rustic, Colorado, were randomly sampled. This
study area reduction and recreation groupings limited the population,
possibly introducing sample bias, but they substantially lower cost
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and effectively included most (60-70 percent) of the recreational
activity in the Poudre Canyon.
To achieve randomness, such that every sample of size n has the
same chance of being selected, we originally chose a random number of
days to interview each month. It was obvious from the first interview
day that following the original plan would be impossible. The Poudre
River spring runoff in 1978 was one of the highest and longest on rec-
ord. During many interview days, from early June to mid-July, when the
runoff was especially high, there were few if any recreationists to be
found. In fact, during one ten-day time span, the river flow was so
high and dangerous that authorities closed the canyon to all water con-
tact recreation use.
The irregular flow conditions resulted in an increase in white
water interviews early in the season and an increase in fishing inter-
views late in the season. Table 3-4 shows the distribution of inter-
view days for each recreation activity.



























The interview process, on any given sample day, attempted to
eliminate any systematic time or location bias. Each day, the six
camp or picnic grounds were randomly ord~red to organize" the interview.
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After completing an interview~ we selected the next household we
encountered then moved to the next site~ the process continued until
two households were contacted on each site. Since there is no reason to
suspect any systematic ordering ofrecreationists this section should
generate a random sample. Initially~ the goal was to interview at the
site. However~ many white water recreationists and a few recreation
parties, who were there for a day picnic, refused to use their recrea-
tion time for an interview. These interviews were completed in their
own homes at a more convenient time.
The most difficult sample construction decision was to choose an
appropriate sample size. The sample information quality depends on the
sample size and the data variation. An increase in the sample size
will increase the probability that sample parameter accurately esti-
mates the true population parameter. Since information collection is
not free, the researcher must tradeoff increases in statistical accu-
racy with collection costs. Mendenhall has suggested a formula for
selecting stratified sample size, n, to estimate a population total or
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w. is the fraction of observation from recreation activity i
1 (i = 1, 2, 3)
3W. Mendenhall, L. Ott, and R. L. Scheaffer, Elementary Survey
Sampling (Belmont, Calif.: Duxbury Press, 1971), p. 61.
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i02 ;s the population variance for recreation activity i
N is the population size
o =~ when estimating the population mean, p, or
B2
D = 4N2 when estimating the population total t
B is the specified bound on the sample estimate.
Solving for the sample size is rather difficult since the popula-
tion variance is unknown. One solution is to use the sample variance
from a prior experiment. If this information is not available, the
Empirical Statistical Rule states that the range is approximately equal
to four standard deviations. 4 But, little information is known about
the instream flow bid variance, and because one could only guess at the
possible bid range, the number of observations was a function of
available time and effort.
Even though the survey was long--the average interview lasted
between 30 and 45 minutes and a few lasted over an hour--the rate of
acceptance was over 80 percent. Shoreline participants had the highest
response rate, only 7 percent refused, since they generally had more
time to relax and sit through the survey. Fishermen were also very
receptive to the survey. 86 percent responded; they as a group had the
most to gain from instream flow management. Kayakers and rafters had
the lowest response rate. We could understand why white water recrea-
tors were unwilling to leave the stream and participate in an on-site
interview; but it was disappointing that only 62 percent were willing
to set aside time for an interview at their own convenience.
The household was the basic sample unit. The interviewer. took time
to insure that the spokesman gave answers that represented the family.
4Ibid ., p. 7.
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Admittedly, thts\ ch.oi~ce. reduces: the, tqste: and preference vari ab1e IS
reliability'. The survey could expli'cityask for an individual wil-
lingness-to-pay response, but to obtain individual answers you would
have to physically separate the respondet, which is not each when they
came to the Poudre River especially for group recreation. The separa-
tion alienating some individuals results tn poor responses to questions
and lower survey response rates'. Since most users participate wi th
a household group, part of the enjoyment comes from interaction be-
tween family members. Using the household as the basic economic unit,
bestdes making the s'urvey more enjoyabl e for the interviewer and the
respondents s-hauld i~mprove the accuracy of tfie key variable, willing-
ness to pay'.
Although the sample sizes were relatively small, the sample
parameters are quite representative of the population. Using demo-
graphic data from the Fort Collins area as a comparison base, the sam-
ple estimates generally reflected local socio-economic characteristics.
Table 3-5 lists the Fort Collins and sample characteristics. Fishing,
shoreline, and white water sample male/female ratios differed from the
Fort Collins ratio. In most households, male members still do most of
the fishing or kayaking. And, in those households where both sexes
fished or kayaked, the male generally supplied the socio-economic data.
In contrast, the female members of households participating in shore-
line activities dominated those responses. The average income of fish-
ing recreationists was considerably higher than the Fort Collins
average. However, this finding is consistent with other studies indi-
cating individuals having the time for leisure activities tend to have
higher incomes. The only other major difference was that kayakers are
generally younger and have less income than typical individuals. Note
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that most recreationists are local residents except for the shoreline
category.
Ta b1e 3-5. Fort Co11 ins and the Samp1e Survey Soci o-economi c
Characteristics, 1977.
Characteristic Fort Col1insA Fishing Shore1 i ne Whi te Water
































































Non-Res./Res. 35.2/64.8 45.8/54.2 40.4/59.6
ASource: Colorado Division of Planning (October 1978).
The on-site interview procedure has one inherent bias. Those who
stay longer have a higher probability of being chosen for the
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interview. Thus, responces which are a fUnction of length of stay
might be biased. For example, recreationists staying in the river can-
yon longer and having a higher willingness to pay for instream flows
might bias the results upward, since they have a higher probability of
being in the survey. Lucas suggested that weighting the household
responses by the linear inverse of the difference between the sample
average and its number of annual days use. 5 Accordingly, we weighted
the responses from households staying in the canyon by the reciprocal
of the difference between the number of days they stayed in the study
area and the sample average.
Questionnaire Design
The survey questionnaire is the most important factor determining
the success or failure of a direct consumer surplus estimation attempt.
Because there ;s no single question design that can guarantee that
respondents won't over- or understate their preferences, the research
methodology included the possibility of misrepresentation. The ques-
tion structure also made it easy for the respondent to give accurate
answers, by using an experimental situation that is realistic and
based on routine behavior. Especially important, questions should not
ask the individual to respond to alternatives beyond the range of his
experience. Ajzen and Fishbein have identified the psychological con-
ditions that enable hypothetical behavior to model actual behavior. 6
5Robert C. Lucas, "Bias in Estimating Recreationist's Length of
Stay from Sample Interviews," Journal of Forestry (December 1963),
pp. 912-914.
61. Ajzen and M. Fishbein, "Attitude-Behavior Relationships: A
Theoretical Perspective and Review of Empirical Research,"
Psychological Bulletin 84 (1977), pp. 888-918.
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Method of Payment
The questionnaire (see Appendix A) includes two question formula-
tions that reduce the hypothetical nature inherent in most bidding game
techniques. Each respondent must pay an entrance fee or a sales tax
before he can use the instream flow. Resource managers have used both
methods to finance changes in the provision of recreational public
goods. Both payment obligations, placing the respondent in realistic
positions, made it easier for him to supply accurate responses.
Most visitors to the Poudre Canyon were familiar with both methods
financing public recreation. Many National parks require a daily vehi-
cle entrance fee. At many campground areas, users must purchase an
overnight camping fee. Since they realize that resource managers use
those fees to supply many recreation-related services, it was easy for
them to see how an entrance fee could finance instream flows. Indi-
viduals also understood how water managers could use sales tax revenues
to finance instream flows. The Denver metropolitan area has a district
sales tax that provides regional transportation services. Public offi-
cials in Pitkin County Colorado use a district sales tax to buy land
for public recreation purposes. Colorado residents routinely pay sales
taxes on market purchases.
Preceding each payment obligation, the questionnaire had an intro-
ductory statement about the interview's purpose. After a few short
questions establishing the respondent's recreation preferences, the
interviewer asked him to reveal his willingness to pay using both pay-
ment methods. Prior to the bidding process, the interviewer stated
that all recreators would pay the sales tax (entrance fee) before they
could enjoy the new stream flow levels. This provision should help to
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avoid some free rider problems. The specific form of each repayment
obligation is given by:
Assume that to gain access to the Poudre River Canyon to
for day(s) of annual use all users must
----:--=-:-
pay a daily entrance fee. All of this daily fee would be
used to provide the best stream flow for your (fishing,
shoreline, white water) enjoyment. This daily fee is the
only way of financing the various water quantities in the
photographs. All users will pay the same fee as you do.
This fee will permit use for all members of your house-
hold going (fishing, shoreline, white water) for
day(s) of annual use. ----
I would like to playa somewhat different bidding game
with you. Suppose that you were going to use the Poudre
River to for day(s) of annual use.
Assume also that a local governmental agency collected an
annual district recreational sales tax to finance the
provision of different stream flows for your (fishing,
shoreline, white water) enjoyment. This annual tax is
the only way to finance the program. All area residents
and visitors to the Poudre River recreation district
would pay the annual sales tax. This sales tax will per-
mit use for all members of your household going ------for day(s) of annual use.
Notice that both formulations explicitly state that the payment is the
only way to finance instream flows. This condition eliminated many
zero bids from those who had objections to the specific payment. If
any respondent still bid zero, or if the bids from one payment were
substantially different from the other, a series of questions designed
to discover his motivation were posed. If the recreationist .responded
with the answer that his willingness to pay was zero because he did not
perceive any benefits from an increase in the stream flow level, his
bid was recorded as zero. But, if he responded that sales taxes were
already too high, or that it is improper to charge an entrance fee to
public property, or any other protest against the specific game, the
respondent was not playing the game and later analysis treated his
answer as a non-response. This check identifies many inappropriate
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responses, but it overlooks downward biased bids in protest to the
method of payment. 7
Table 3-6 shows the number and percentage of radically lower and
zero protest bids. Recreationists were more likely to protest the
sales tax game. Those, with low marginal instream flow utility, real-
ized that they would help pay for other's enjoyment. Shoreline parti-
cipants had the highest rate of protest against either game. Unlike
the use in fishing and white water activities, instream flows are not
crucial to enjoy shoreline recreation. This recreation group has less
motivation to pay, and more motivation to avoid taxes or entrance fees.
These two games determine an interval for the aggregate
willingness-to-pay curves. 8 The entrance fee forces the participant to
pay an amount equal to his stated willingness to pay. Respondents
biasing their entrance fee answers probably gave bids lower than their
true willingness to pay, hoping that the aggregate payment would be
large enough to suggest provision of more flow at a fee lower than
their true willingness to pay. Conversely, recreationists may have an
incentive to overstate their willingness to pay during the sales tax
game. A sales tax is a fee that all individuals must pay independent
of the times they use the Poudre River. Since any increase in sales
taxes to provide more instream flow is likely to be small, those with
strong preferences toward river flow have an incentive to overstate
their bid, maximizing the chance that public officials increase the
instream flow quantity.
7Randall, Ives, and Eastman, Ope cit., p. 138.
8Bohm , II Estimati ng Access Values, II op. ci t., p. 193.
Table 3-6. The Frequency of Protest Bids
Fishing Shoreline White Water Total
Entrance Sales Entrance Sales Entrance Sales Entrance Sales
Fee Tax Fee Tax Fee Tax Fee Tax
~No. of Non-response
Zero Bi ds 1 2 2 5 1 2 4 9
(%) (2%) (4%) (4%) (11 %) (3%) (5%) (3%) (7%)
No. of Downward Biased
Protest Bids 2 2 3 3 1 1 6 6
(%) (4%) (4%) (7%) (7%) (3%) (3%) (4%) (4%) +::-(.J1
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The Bidding Procedure
The bidding questions are very similar to the iterative approaches
in the Randall and Brookshire studies. The interviewer asks each
respondent to reveal his/her willingness to pay for instream flow in
terms of a percentage increase in the present sales tax rate and an
increase in an entrance fee. Always beginning with the lowest instream
flow quantity, the interviewer asked the household how much it would be
willing to pay for the next highest instream flow situation. For exam-
ple, the recreationist would respond with a "yes" or "no" answer to the
following question:
If the entrance fee cost $ per day, would you pay the
fee so the members of your household could travel up the
Poudre River Canyon to (activity) for day(s) of
annual use, if that amount resulted in an increase in
water flow from those in Picture A to Picture B1
The interviewer started the bids at $1.00 for the entrance fee game and
a .1 percent increase in the sales tax for the sales tax game. If the
respondent answered with a "yes," the interviewer raised the bid by
$.25 or .1 percent increments until the respondent answered "no." The
interviewer, then, lowered the bid, until he received another "yes"
answer. The dollar amount at the last "yes " response represents the
household's maximum willingness to pay for the specific instream flow
improvement.
Since few individuals knew what a percentage increase in sales
taxes would mean to them, prior to the bidding process the interviewer
presented a table showing the annual dollar equivalent of the percent
change in sales taxes. The tables showed the current sales tax payment
in dollars, depending on the family size and income, and the additional
dollar amount he could expect to pay if sales taxes increased. The
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data was calculated from the 1978 Colorado State Income Tax Information
Booklet.
Color Photographs
Color photographs showing eight different instream flow levels at
four different sites helped the hypothetical bidding game to model a
realistic situation. These levels were well within the range of most
recreation experiences. The photographs minimized the respondent's
need to imagine how the Poudre River looks at different flow levels,
and provided a uniform comparison base. Figure~, shows the color pho-
tographs for four flow levels at one site in the Poudre River Canyon.
The four chosen sites best illustrated the potential change in the
instream recreation utility after a change in the flow level. Even
though all pictures were taken on the same day, the instream flow was
not tfle s~me.. Two sites are above a large irrigation diversion and
the north fork of the Poudre River. Ideally, the photographs should be
identical except for the instream flow quantity. However, nature, and
not man, controls the stream flow--high in the spring and low in the
fall. To capture different levels, the pictures had to be taken during
four different months in 1977 resulting in different site backgrounds.
Also, the water quality varies as the high spring runoff makes the
river "muddy" when compared to other instream flow levels.
Hydrologic Data
Color photographs realistically illustrate the change in the rec-
reation experience, but, they fail to capture the non-visual changes
from diffent instream flow quantities. The survey interviewer provided
additional information on depth, velocity, and the change in trout
~
co
Figure 4,. Pour Instream Flow Levels! Poudre River Colorado! 1978.
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catch rate for each cfs flow rate. A river gaging station at the can-
yon mouth provided data on the cfs rate at the sites below the irriga-
tion diversion points on the days the pictures were taken. Subtracting
the North Greeley Canal diversion generated the cfs rate at the other
sites.
Depth and velocity predictions for each cfs discharge rate
required river cross section survey at each site. Given the stream
cross section profile and the stream substrata at each site, a water
surface profile computer program can forecast the depth and velocities
at the stream at different discharge rates. 9 Each respondent was
shown a picture of the stream cross section:similar to the one in
Figure 5.
The Cooperative Instream Flow Service Group (IFG) fish habitat
model calculates the probability of a trout being in a specific reach
of river, given different flow regimes. 10 The model uses the hydro-
logic output from the water surface profile program along with trout
behavior to generate an ordinal index measuring the Poudre River
suitability for a trout habitat. The term for this measure is
"weighted usable surface area" (WUSA) (see Appendix B and C).
Probability-of-use curves describe the trout behavior. These
curves assume that trout prefer areas in a stream that have ideal con-
ditions, but they will live in less favorable velocity and depth
9Hydrology Branch of the Division of Project Investigations, U.S.
Department of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Guide for Applications
of the Water Surface Profile Com uter Pro ram, Denver, Colorado
December 1968 .
lOKen D. Bovee and Tim Cochnauer, Development and Evaluation of
Weighted Criteria - Probability of Use Curves for Instream Flow
Assessment: Fisheries, Cooperative Instream Flow Service Group, Fort
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Figure 5 . Cross Section of Site C, Poudre River Canyon, 1978.
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conditions according to a diminishing probability of use. The model
also assumes that trout will vacate a stream reach before the flow
becomes lethal. For example, if the stream depth and velocity is per-
fectly suited for trout, then the WUSA and actual stream surface area
would be the same. The probability of finding a trout in that stream
reach would be 1. A reach with velocity and depth different from the
ideal conditions has a lower chance of containing a trout. If the
probability of a trout living in the river section where the velocity
is two cfs equals .5 and the probability a trout is there if the depth
equals l' is .1, then the joint probability is .5 times .1 = .05. Even
though the stream surface area may be 100, the WUSA is only 5. The
actual 100 sq. ft. of surface area will contain only five sq. ft. where
the probability of finding a trout, in a specific life stage, is 1.
Anyone of the 100 sq. ft. is equally likely to be the one of the five
WUSA with a trout. Appendix Cshows the probability curves for rainbow
trout in the adult life stage and the ~~SA for rainbow and brown trout.
Estimating the catch rate for each flow level required two tenuous
but necessary assumptions: (1) a one-to-one direct relationship
between standing crop and the catch rate. Any increase or decrease in
WUSA from the base flow changes the average catch rate. Table 3-7
shows the percentage change in the catch rate and the average rate per
hour of effort, given the calibration catch rate of .65 trout/hr. at an
instream flow of 30 cfs. 11 The calibration catch rate is the weighted
average over: fly, lure, and bait fishermen; at stocked andunstocked
f>oudre River sections; of rainbow and brown trout; at adult and
llThomas L. Marshall, op. cit., p. 56.
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juvenile life stages. This additional information helped the respond-
ent to make honest and accurate wi11ingness-to-pay bids.



































The hypothesis, in this thesis, is that willingness to pay is a
function of flow and particular socio-economic parameters. A general
linear multiple regression model approximates the specific underlying
relationships. In matrix notation the model is:
y = Xs + £
where
Y = an NXl vector of wi1lingness-to-pay value or transformations
of these values
x = NXK matrix of independent variable observations
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a = a KXl column vector of unknown parameters
E = an NXl column vector of stochastic disturbances
The assumptions of the classical linear regression model are given
by the following:
The elements of X are fixed and have finite variance.
X has a rank, K, which is less than the number of independent
observations, N.
E is normally distributed with E(E) = 0 and E (EEl) = a 2I, where
I is an NXN identity matrix.
Y is normally distributed, E(y) = xa and E{[y-E(y)][y-E(y)]'}=cr2I
If the model satisfies these assumptions then the ordinary least-
squares estimator (OLS) of a is the best among the linear unbiased
estimators. However, few bidding game research studies have data that
satisfy all the assumptions.
Survey information, in this thesis, may result in multicolline-
arity, heterosedasticity, mis-specification of the model, and non-
normally distributed sample values. These statistical problems may
bias the estimators. Perfect multicollinearity occurs when at least
one independent variable is a linear combination of the others. This
condition causes the number of variables to exceed the number of inde-
pendent equations. Less than perfect multicollinearity arises when
the independent variables are highly correlated with each other. For
example, education and income might be highly correlated. Hetero-
scedasticity violates the assumption that the error term has a constant
variance. It is possible that the bid variances at very low or high
instream flow levels are small, but large for optimal water flow condi-
tions. Omitting important inclusing inappropriate independent
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variables may also violate one or more. classical assumption. The
statistical tests of each violation didn't reveal any major statis-
tical problems.
Overa11, the results in the fo 11 owi:ng chapter depend on the
complete and correct data collection and model estimation procedure
in this chapter. Each step, from the study area choi'ce to sampl e
selection and survey decis50n, and last the statistical estimation,
must attempt to reduce the possibility of s-ample, hypothetical, and
statistical bias. The validity of the ins-tream flow value estimate
rests on the model construction.
CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In Colorado~ agencies managing wildlife and recreation have long
known that water flowing instream is worth something to the recreation-
ist. But~ they have lacked specific information on the instream flow
economic value necessary to evaluate alternative stream flow investment
and management strategies. This chapter reports the empirical bidding
game estimates of willingness to pay for instream flows. The first
section presents the ordinary least squares statistical estimate of the
total instream flow bid functions for fishing~ shoreline~ and white
water activities. The next~ and most important, section develops the
individual and aggregate marginal instream flow economic values. The
marginal instream flow benefits are comparable with values in other
uses. The last section analyzes the significant socio-economic varia-
bles effecting the recreationist1s total bid. Water managers can use
the marginal instream flow values in their water allocation decision
making process.
Variable Description
The bidding game procedure approximates the "Bradford" bid func-
tion. Recall that from the discussion of Chapter 2 this function maps
out the maximum income the recreationist would give up for changes in
the stream flow level. Thus, the Bradford bid curve becomes the total
expenditure curve, equal to the intergral of a compensated instream
flow demand curve. l The basic function form is,
lBradford~ Ope cit., p. 783.
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k
TWP. 'f = a .. + yQ .. + E S X" k + e. 'k'lJ lJ lJ k=l lJ lJ
The left-hand term, TWP"f' is the total bid for activity i bylJ
household j for instream flow f. In this study, the total willingness
to pay is a per day value. Entrance fee questions asked the household
to respond specifically with a daily bid; responses to the sales tax
questions were in annual amounts. For consistency, the sales tax
annual values were converted into daily terms by dividing each bid by
the number of days the household participated in the recreation
activity. TWP represents the Hicksian compensating surplus measure of
consumer surplus.
Total willingness to pay is a function of the instream flow quan-
tity, Qij' River stage, in cubic feet per second, is the flow index.
The interviewer, using color photographs, varies the flow throughout
the experiment to assess its impact on the total willingness to pay.
This index may oversimplify changes in the stream flow. Alternative
river stages and the same stage at different sites on the river have
different velocity and depth characteristics that separately may have
important impacts on willingness to pay. Including information on the
velocity and depth at each site for different river stages, hopefully,
reduced the separate effects. The river shape controls the site
velocity and depth characteristics, while the water manager can only
control the cfs rate.
Uncontrollable independent parameters describe the household's
tastes and preference for instream flow in a specific recreation
activity. The most important socio-economic variables are income, set-
ting limits on the respondents' ability to pay for additional instream
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flow, substitution possibilities at other river sites, and physical
descriptions, like: age, education, and sex. Table ~l summarizes the
model variables.
Table 4-1. Possible Equation Variables.
PDPi (i=1. . . 5)














SITEi (i=l 4)DCi (i =1 9)
Dependent Variable
Total daily bid for recreation activity i, household j,
instream flows; in 1978 for each bidding game vehicle
of paYment
Independent Variables
1 River stage in cubic ft. second (instream flow)
2 (River stage)2
3 Total number of activity i days in the
Poudre River Canyon
4 (Total number of activity i days in the
Poudre River Canyon)2
5 Total number of activity i days in other
river canyons
6 Total number of years the respondent has
participated in activity i
7 Income
8 (Income)2
9 Age of respondent
10 Sex of respondent
11 Education
12 Site of color photographs




14 Employer of Respondent
(l-Mfg., 2-Const., 3-Retai1,
4-Financial, 5-Health, 6-Education,
7-Public Amn., 8-Agr., 9-Unemployed)
15 Population size of previous residence
(l-large city, 2-medium city,
3-sma11 city, 4-town, 5-farm)
16 Date of Interview
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Ordinary Least-Squares Estimates of the Total Willingness-to-Pay
Functions
Both art and science play important roles when estimating a
willingness-to-pay instream flow relationship. The economic models, in
Chapter 2, and the non-market instream flow measurement techniques pro-
vide only general equation formulations, and partial guidelines con-
cerning the important recreation attributes. Since no unique economic
model or statistical estimation procedure exists, personal judgement
aids in formulating the bid equation. Selecting a demand relationship
involves analyzing each equation according to the following three cri-
teria:
1) For reliable predictions, include as many independent varia-
bles as possible. The ~ measures the equations l power to explain the
variance in willingness to pay between recreationists, and informally
represents the prediction potential of all the independent variables
combined in one equation.
2) Another goal is to estimate stable structural parameters.
A coefficient is stable if it remains relatively constant and has the
same sign throughout the equation estimations. Again, the objective is
to include any stable independent variable, even if it explains very
little bid variation.
3) The last criterion involves the economics of scarcity.
Because adding variables is not costless, requiring computer and data
collection time, the objective is to include as few variables as pos-
sible, yet still describe the important relationships.
The compromise between these criteria ends by selecting the best
regression equation.
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For additions to the instream river flow, economic theory suggests
that total willingness to pay increases at an increasing rate, contin.-
ues to increase at a decreasing rate until willingness to pay reaches a
maximum bid for some instream flow, then finally, for higher instream
quantities, willingness to pay decreases. Both low order polynomial
and logarithmic functions can model that relationship, and both forms
were tested in the data. It was found that the polynomial equation
estimates consistently explained more variance in the individual bids.
Tables 4~2 through 4-7 present the quadratic model for fishing and
shoreline activities, and a linear model for white water activites.
The number under the column labeled "order" reflects the sequence the
explanatory variable entered the equation during a stepwise estimation
procedure. Each time a variable enters the equation, the stepwise
technique checks the other variables in the equation to determine if
they should remain in the model. Appendix 0 presents the stepwise
statistical models of alternative sets of the independent variables.
After making estimates, the next objective of statistical infer-
ence is to make judgements (hypothesis tests) about population parame-
ters from the sample estimates. Performing the following three mu1ti-
ple regression hypothesis tests, we assumed that the sample parameters
come from a normal population distribution, that provides the correct
statistical model. The first test checks to see if the intercept
equals zero. 2 The test statistic, HO' is
2Jan Kmenta, Elements of Econometrics (New York: Macmillan
Publishing Co., 1971), p. 366.
Table 4-2. Ordinary Least-Squares Estimates of Entrance Fee Bidding Game: Total Willingness to Pay
per Day for Instream Flow in the Production of Recreational Fishing Activities, Poudre River,
1978.
Regression Standard Error Order of
Explanatory Variable Coefficient of Coefficient t-statistic Entry
Instream Flow (CFS) . 1295 .72 E-1 3.55 3
Instream Flow Squared (CFS) -. 138 E-3 .52 E-4 5.28 1
No. of activity days in Poudre - .13 .21 E-l 5.97 4
No. of activity days in Poudre squared .21 E-2 .63 E-3 3.21 13
No. of years of fishing experience .43 E-l .88 E-2 4.85 11
Education in years -.71 ·14 4.91 6
Site dummy 2 -.36 ·14 2.50 2
Employment dummy
Housewife -1.37 .31 4.40 8
Clerical worker -1.28 .30 4.30 5 ~:0
-.52 .20 2.64 14
Employer dummy
Manufacturing .81 .18 4.76 9
Health services 1. 14 .42 2.73 12
Financial .85 .21 4.08 10
Size of residence dummy
Rural area or town .56 ·12 4.60 7





Table 4~3. Ordinary Least-Squares Estimates of Sales Tax Bidding Game: Total Willingness to Pay
per Day for Instream Flow in the Production of Recreational Fishing Activities, Poudre River,
1978.
Regression Standard Error Order of
Explanatory Variable Coefficient of Coefficient t-statistic Entry
Instream Flow .1761 .12 E-1 4.65 3
Instream Flow Squared -.1563 E-3 .90 E-4 5.78 1
No. of activity days in Poudre -. 18 .38 E-1 6.79 2
No. of activity days in Poudre squared .28 E-2 .32 E-3 3.60 12
No. of years of fishing experience .28 E-l .13 E-l 2. 15 11
Income .13 E-2 .47 E-3 2.09 13
Site dummy 2 -.67 .20 3.37 6
Employment dummy
Housewife -.97 .41 2.35 5
Skilled worker .48 ·19 2.56 7 m~
Clerical worker -.35 ·11 3. 19 10
Employer dummy
Education .88 ·19 4.53 14
Manufacturing .35 .15 3. 19 9
Size of residence
Medium size city 1.65 .25 6.51 4
Large city -.83 ·16 5.14 8





Table-~4. Ordinary Least-Squares Estimates of Entrance Fee Bidding Game: Total Willingness to Pay
per Day for I'nstream Flow in the Production of Recreattonal Shoreline Acti"vities,
Poudre River, 1978.
Regression Standard Error Order of
Explanatory Variable Coefficient of Coefficient t-statistic Entry
Instream Flow .1485 E-1 .41 E-2 2.29 7
Instream Flow Squared -.1045 E-4 .29 E-5 2.18 8
No. of activity days in Poudre .20 .41 E-l 5.30 2
No. of activity days in Poudre squared -.97 E-2 .39 E-2 2.48 17
No. of years of shoreline experience -.10 .28 E-l 6.02 3
Income -.86 E-2 .29 E-2 2. 18 6
Age in years .66 E-l .72 E-2 6. 13 9
Sex (O=ma1e 1=fema1e) .32 .91 E-1 3.47 16
Education (in years) -.28 .98 E-1 6.34 4
Employment dummy m.
Salesman .76 · 14 5.34 1 N
Housewife 1.91 .27 6.94 13
Student 1.51 .24 6.32 15
Employer dummy
Manufacturing -.55 · 11 4.80 12
Health services .59 ·12 4.92 11
Education services .20 .31 2.83 14
Size of residence
Small city 1.01 .26 3.88 10
Medium-size city .73 .14 5.26 5




Table 4-5. Ordinary Least-Squares Estimates of Sales Tax Bidding Game: Total Willingness to Pay
per Day for Instream Flow in the Production of Recreational Shoreline Activities,
Poudre River, 1978.
Regression Standard Error Order of
Explanatory Variable Coefficient of Coefficient t-statistic Entry
Instream Flow . 178 E-1 .77 E-2 2.61 10
Instream Flow Squared -.1375 E-4 .56 E-5 2.56 11
No. of activity days in Poudre .24 .20 E-l 5.06 4
No. of activity days in Poudre squared -.54 E-2 .68 E-3 3.94 6
No. of years of shoreline experience -. 19 .81 E-1 5.23 14
Income -.75 E-2 .64 E-3 2.09 8
Age in years
Employment durrmy
Housewife 2.51 .29 8.41 1
Clerical worker 1.09 .21 5.25 3 5}
Employer dummy
Public administration -1.07 .24 4.43 7
Manufacturing -1.39 . 19 4.45 2
Health services .44 .11 4.09 9
Education services .33 .15 2.23 13
Size of residence
Small city .56 .31 2.63 12
Medium-size city .91 .15 6.00 5




Table 4-6. Ordinary Least-Squares Estimates of Entrance Fee Bidding Game: Total Willingness to Pay





No. of activity days in Poudre
No. of activity days in Poudre squared



















































Table 4-7. Ordinary Least-Squares Estimates of Sales Tax Bidding Game: Total Willingness to Pay





No. of activity days in Poudre
No. of activity days in Poudre squared
























































"Bk is the estimated slope coefficient
SBk is the estimated standard error of Bk
t is the appropriate t- statistic
Yk is equal to zero.
A priori, one expects this test would fail to reject the hypothesis
that the intercept equals zero. Those participating in stream activi-
ties are probably not willing to pay for a zero instream flow increase.
Except for the sales tax-shoreline regression model, the intercept is
not statistically different from zero at the 95 percent test level.
The next test looks at the possibility that the explanatory varia-
bles do not have any effect on recreationist willingness to pay.3 If
this hypothesis is true, then the bid variation is not a function of
the survey variables. The null hypothesis is
and the appropriate statistic is
Sum of squares due to regression
(k-l) - F
-S'=""u-m-o-:f-s-q-u-a-r-e~s-d~u--£e~t-o-r-e-s--::-i--::-du-a-=l=-- k- l' n- k
(n-k)
At the 95 percent confidence level, the test rejects the null hypothe-
sis; variables in the regression equation do influence individual
willingness to pay for instream flows. The regression equation
explains more bid variation than the mean value.
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Tables 4-2 to 4-7 present two regression equations, a sales tax
and an entrance fee, for each recreation activity. Theoretically, the
repayment obligation may cause respondents to bias their willingness to
pay. Statistically, the sales tax bid function slope and position may
be different from the entrance fee slope and position. Testing the
equality between two regression equations involves a null hypothesis
that the function parameters are the same. 4 If the sales tax function
is
(i=l ... n),
and the entrance bid function is
(i=n+l,n+2, ... ,n+m)
then the null hypothesis ;s
The test statistic using the OLS sales tax function, OLS entrance fee
'function, and an OLS function from the combination of both data sets is
(SSES + SSEE)/(n + m _ 2k) - Fk, (n+m-2k)'
where SSE ;s the sum of squared residual from the combined equation,
SSES is the sum of squared residuals from the sales tax equation, and
SSEE is the sum of the squared residuals from the entrance fee
4Ibid., p. 373.
68
equation. At the 95 percent confidence level the sales tax function is
different from the entrance fee bid function, for all activities.
Besides testing hypotheses, one must check to insure the sample
satisfies the classical linear regression assumptions concerning multi-
collinearity and heteroscedasticity. In some models income was corre-
lated with either age or education, and sex was related to particular
dummy employments and employers. For example, the female sex variable
was highly correlated to the dummy employment, housewife. If a model
had highly correlated parameters, one of the variables was omitted from
the regression. Overall, the OLS regression equations didn't suggest
problems of multicollinearity. Most predictors had large t-values,
even when the R2 was small.
Heteroscedastictty, violating the constant error variance assump-
tion, might also occur. The bid variance at low and high instream
flows, where few people fish, might be less than the bid variance at
medium instream flows. Both the Bartlett and Goldfeld-Quant tests 5
failed to reject the null hypothesis that the variance between differ-
ent groupings of willingness to p~y had equal variances. Also, a
generalized least-squares estimation procedure failed to improve the
ordinary regression modell's fit or stabil ity.
All estimates of the total Bradford bid curve resulted in, at
least for bidding game cross section studies, a reasonable fit. The
statistic '[2, corrected for the number of independent variables in the
equation, measures the proportion of the variation in the willingness
to pay the multiple regression equation explains. For example, the ~
5Robert S. Pindyck and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Econometric Models and
Economic Forecasts (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976), pp. 103-106.
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in the fishing, entrance fee model (.41) means that the regression
equation explains 41 percent of the bid variance. Note, model compari-
sons by ~ are not appropriate, because the equations have different
independent variables. If the variable list in Table 4....1 completely
specifies the instream flow willingness-to-pay relationship, then ~
does explain how well the model fits the data. 6
Another objective, other than obtaining the largest ~, is to
estimate stable and reliable structural parameters. All six models
included coefficients with relatively large t-ratios. The t-ratio:
",
t B.. = J
J s:
J
represents the ratio of the estimated coefficient to its standard
error. A coefficient is statistically significant if the ltjl exceeds
the t-value at a particular significance level. For large samples,
(n-k = 30), if the t-ratio exceeds two, then the coefficient is sig-
nificant, and the parameter does effect the recreationist's willingness
to pay for instream flow. Larger t-ratios imply rejection of the null
hypotheses is harder. That is to say, willingness to pay is linearly
dependent on the specific paramater.
According to the t-ratio, instream flow quantity is the principle
determinate of fishing and white water recreationist value, but, not of
shoreline value. Flow and its companion variable, (F1ow)2, are highly
significant (t-ratios between 3.55 and 5.78) in the fishing models.
Flow by itself is highly significant in the white water model (t-ratios
of 21.68 and 15.05). Even though Flow and (Flow)2 are statistically
6Ibid., P. 58.
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significantly in the shoreline models, their t-ratios are much smaller
(between 2.18 and 2.61).
The variation in bids explaind by Flow and (Flow)2 substantiates
the importance of instream flows in fishing and white water activities,
and its lesser significance in shoreline activities. Flow and (F10w)2
explained 20 percent of the bid variation in the sales tax fishing
regression and 21 percent in the entrance fee fishing model. In the
white water sales tax and entrance fee equations, Flow alone explained
38 percent and 53 percent of the bid variation. But, both variables
could explain only 3 percent and 6 percent of the shoreline sales tax
and entrance fee bid variation.
The stability, magnitude, and signs of Flow and (F10w)2 estimates
also indicate that instream flow quantity and recreationist willingness
to pay are closely associated. Flow and (F1ow)2, serving as proxy mea-
sures for the total change in recreation and aesthetic improvements
from stream flow changes, have appropriate functional forms. Those
two variables describe a quadratic relationship between instream flow
quantities and willingness to pay for fishing and shoreline activities,
and a linear function for white water activities. The maximum total
willingness to pay for instream flow in fishing experiences occurs at
between the 450 and 550 cfs instream flow. At this point, first
derivative and the marginal willingness to pay equals zero. This eco-
nomic maximum corresponds closely with the trout catch rate/hr. peak
indicated by the hydrologic and biological model in Chapter 3. Fisher-
men, without the complex physical model guides, know which flow level
provides the best fishing. The economic values only confirm that
knowledge.
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Like the fishing equation, the shoreline model is also quadratic
in terms of Flow and (Flow)2, but, the total willingness to pay didn't
peak until the instream flow was approximately 750 cfs. High instream
flows still provide shoreline utility, since recreationists don't need
to enter the stream to enjoy their activities. Shoreline total bids
increase over a larger range of instream flows, but the absolute magni-
tude is much smaller than the fishing total bids. As long as the
Poudre River isn't dry or over bank full, the shoreline recreationist
is relatively indifferent between alternative instream flow levels.
The white water regressions, in contrast to the equations repre-
senting the other two activities, included the variable Flow, but the
variable (Flow)2 failed to enter the equation. Total willingness to
pay increased over the instream flows shown in the color photographs.
Most likely a maximum exists, but at a flow level beyond those in the
pictures, when the river becomes very dangerous to kayak or raft
(approximately 3,000-4,000 for the Poudre River). At those extremely
high flow levels many white water recreationists would reduce their
willingness to pay. Had the survey included photographs at very high
flow levels, the resulting white water equation would have resembled
the other two activity equations.
Aggregate Instream Flow Marginal Values
Overall, the instream flow level seems to predict total value
well. But, water managers comparing the benefits and costs of alter-
native instream flow quantities need information about marginal values
rather than the total value. Economic choices focus on the incremental
benefits from increased instream flow compared to the incremental
benefits from water diversions. So that water planners can set minimum
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flow regulation, they must know the instream flow shadow price for
recreation, and that value must be commensurate and comparable with the
marginal value in withdrawal uses. The instream flow aggregate mar-
ginal values were computed using the following steps:
1. Multiply all significant coefficients in the total bid function by
the mean, except for the variables Flow and (Flow)2. Next, add
those amounts to the regression constant to form a "reduced"
regression model relating total individual willingness to pay and
the instream flow level. 7
2. The first derivative of the total bid curve at each instream flow
level corresponds to the conventional economic marginal demand
function, mathematically:
aTWP ..
-=-=_l~J = b, + b2 (Flow)aFlow
i recreation activity
j = type of bidding game
3. Steps 1 and 2 combine to produce a function that determines indi-
vidual willingness to pay (per day) for each additional cfs of
water flowing in the Poudre River. Because instream flows are pub-
lic goods, it becomes necessary to aggregate the individual bid
over an appropriate user population for a specific time period.
For example, assume the river flow is at 100 cfs aggregating
over"all fishermen using the Poudre River per day produceses a
value for an. additional cfs of water for re.creat·ional fishing
7J . A. Sinden, "An Utility Approach to the Valuation of Recreation
and Aesthetic Experiences,1I American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
Vo1. 56, No. 1 (February 1974 ) .
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activities equal to $23.23.
Tables 4-8, 4-9, and 4-10 show the individual and aggregate mar-
ginal willingness to pay for instream flow in the Poudre River, assum-
ing that the 1978 projected activity use rates represent the true
recreation population. Policy makers should use these marginal values
for decision making concerning alternative instream flow levels.
The marginal curves exhibited reasonable economic behavior. Each
additional cfs for fishing activities is worth less than the previous
one. When the flow is low, 50 cfs or below, the instream value for
fishing experiences is very high, $26.38 per cfs/day. The marginal
value falls as the flow in the river increases. A river stage at or
above SOD cfs has a marginal instream flow value equal to zero or even
negative.
Similarly, the marginal instream value for shoreline activities
diminishes, turning negative if the river flow exceeds 700 cfs. At low
stream flow, the marginal value for shoreline activities is much less
than the marginal value for fishing experiences. Marginal shoreline
value also diminishes at a slower rate over a longer range of flow in
the river. Shoreline households had positive preferences for having
flow in the river, but changes in the flow level provided very little
additional utility.
White water marginal instream flow value is slightly different.
Over the flow range in the photographs, the total bid increased accord-
ing to a linear function. Thus, the first derivative (marginal value
of water) is a constant. Extra instream flow units for white water
activities are all worth approximately $9.55.
Table 4-8. Individual and Aggregate Marginal Willingness to Pay per Day for Instream Flow in the
Production of Fishing Recreational Experiences, Poudre River, 1978.
Entrance Fee Game Sales Tax Game
Individual Aggregate~ Confidenceb/ Individual Aggregatea/ ConfidenceQ/
Flow Marginal Marginal Interval Marginal Marginal Interval
(cfs) WTP/Day WTP/Day + WTP/Day WTP/Day +-
0
50 $. 116 $26.38 $7.66 $.160 $36.59 $9.60
100 .102 23.23 6.75 ·145 33.02 8.02
150 .088 20.09 5.91 ·129 29.46 6.95
200 .074 16.94 5.04 ·114 25.90 6.20
250 .061 13.79 4.33 .098 22.33 5.99
300 .047 10.65 3.86 .082 18.77 5.70
350 .033 7.50 3.32 .067 15.21 5.59
""-..I
400 .019 4.35 2.97 .051 11 .64 5.18 .p.
450 .005 1.21 2.69 .035 8.78 5.03
500 -.009 -1.94 2.45 .020 4.51 4.85
550 -.022 -5.09 2.40 .004 .95 4.80
600 -.036 -8.23 2.68 -.011 -2.61 5.11
650 -.050 -11.38 3.01 -.027 -6.18 5.32
700 -.064 -14.52 3.49 -.043 -9.74 5.86
750 -.078 -17.67 4.00 -.058 -13.30 5.92
800 -.091 -20.82 4.62 -.074 -16.87 6.13
850 - .105 -23.96 5.39 -.090 -20.43 6.52
900 -. 119 -27.11 6.12 -.105 -23.99 7.19
a/The average number of fishermen per day (228) represents the aggregate population.
Q1The confidence interval is at the 5 percent level.
Table 4-9. Individual and Aggregate Marginal Willingness to Pay per Day for Instream Flow in the
Production of Shoreline Recreational Experiences,a/ Poudre River, 1978.
Entrance Fee Game Sales Tax Game
Individual Aggregate!y Confidence,9' Individual Aggregate~ ConfidenceQl
Flow Marginal Marginal Interval Marginal Marginal Interval
(cfs) WTP/Day WTP/Day + WTP/Day WTP/Day +- -
0
50 $.027 $17.48 $17.56 $.033 $21.16 $21.55
100 .026 16. 15 16.61 .031 19.53 20.16
150 .023 14.83 15.71 .028 17.91 18.85
200 .021 13.51 14.88 .026 16.28 17.62
250 .019 12. 19 14. 13 .023 14.65 16.50
300 .017 10.86 13.47 .021 13.03 15.49
350 .015 9.54 12.92 .018 11.40 14.64 ......,
400 .013 8.22 12.50 .015 9.77 13.97 tTl
450 .011 6.89 12.20 .013 8.15 13.51
500 .009 5.57 12.06 .010 6.52 13.28
550 .007 4.25 12.06 .008 4.89 13.29
600 .005 2.92 12.22 .005 3.27 13.53
650 .003 1.60 12.51 .003 1.64 14.01
700 .44E-3 .28 12.95 .2E-4 .01 14.69
750 -.002 -1.04 13.51 -.003 -1 .61 15.55
800 -.004 -2.36 14.17 -.005 -3.24 16.56
850 -.006 -3.69 14.93 -.008 -4.87 17.70
900 -.008 -5.01 15.77 -.010 -6.49 18.93
~Shoreline activities include picnicking, hiking, camping, swimming, wading, viewing, etc.
Q1The average number of shoreline users per day (633) represents the aggregate population.
flThe confidence interval is at the 5 percent level.
Table 4'-10. Individual and Aggregate Marginal Willingness to Pay per Day for Instream Flow in the
Production of ~Jhite ~Jater Recreational Experiences, Poudre River, 1978.
Entrance Fee Game Sales Tax Game
Individual Aggregate"Y Confidence£! Individual Aggregatea/ Confidenceb/
Flow Marginal Marginal Interval Marginal Marginal Interval
(cfs) WTP/Day WTP/Day + WTP/Day WTP/Day +
0
50 $. 191 $9.55 $5.96 $.288 $14.40 $8.93
100 ·191 9.55 5.80 .288 14.40 8.50
150 · 191 9.55 5.63 .288 14.40 8.32
200 · 191 9.55 5.41 .288 14.40 8. 17
250 ·191 9.55 5. , 9 .288 14.40 8.05
300 ·191 9.55 5.03 .288 14.40 7.88
350 ·191 9.55 4.95 .288 14.40 7.69
400 ·191 9.55 4.79 .288 14.40 7.61 ........0'\
450 ·191 9.55 4.61 .288 14.40 7.55
500 · 191 9.55 4.54 .288 14.40 7.49
550 ·191 9.55 4.50 .288 14.40 7.47
600 · 191 9.55 4.56 .288 14.40 7.51
650 · 191 9.55 4.65 .288 14.40 7.59
700 .191 9.55 4.83 .288 14.40 7.68
850 ·191 9.55 4.99 .288 14.40 7.93
900 · 191 9.55 5.09 .288 14.40 8.07
~The average number of white water users per day (50) represents the aggregate population.
£!The confidence interval is at the 5 percent level.
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Theoretical Tests of the Bidding Game Outcome
The statistical equations represent the recreationist's willing-
ness to pay assuming the respondents didn't bias their bids and that a
different income distribution won't change the demand curve position.
Economists have shown that respondents may potentially conceal their
true willingness to pay. Fortunately, the research outcomes indicated
that these theoretical problems are insigniftcant. Willingness to pay
depends on the marginal utility of instream flows, rather than the mar-
ginal utility of income. Income was signifi'cant only in the sales tax,
fishing model and both shoreline models. Recalling Figure 3-4 in
Chapter 3, if the b coefficient in the uti'li:ty function approximates
zero, then the indifference curves become vertically parallel. Thus,
the recreationist's willingness to pay for instream flow and income are
independent. A non-linear estimate of the sales tax fishing b was .678
E-6, while it was .346 E=5 for the sales tax, shoreline utility
function, and .389 E-5 for the entrance fee shoreline utility function.
Given the small b value, the aggregate marginal instream flow benefit
curve slope or position would appear to be relatively insensitive to
changes in the distribution of income.
Survey bid outcomes also indicated that respondents did reveal
their true willingness to pay for instream flows. According to
Brookshire,8 the bid distribution should be flatter than normal, if
respondents did, as a group, bias their willingness-to-pay responses.
Indivi.duals favoring higher instream flows: would respond with very
high bids; individuals against flow increases would respond with zero
bids.
8Srookshire, Ives, and Schulze, Ope cit.
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The bid distributions in Table 4-11 do not reveal abnormal or
biased behavior. The fishing models have the largest proportion of
high bids probable because fishermen have strong preferences for
instream flow. The stream's ability to produce a quality fishery is
very sensitive to large or small flow levels. Many respondents did bid
zero, but it represented their true willingness to pay. Flow increases
beyond some upper limit actually decrease the quality of the fishing
or shoreline experience. Thus, individuals were not willing to pay for
very large increases in the stream flow. Si'milarly, white water rec-
reationists needed more than small flow changes before the river can
support kayaking and rafting activities.
Table 4-11. Bid Distribution by Type of Recreation Activity.
Activity
Bid Fishing Shoreline White Water
TI) (no.) (no. ) (no. )
0 202 199 402
0-1 55 155 23
1-2 178 392 88
2-3 87 215 89
3-4 172 96 76
4-5 160 27 49
5-6 103 15 49
6-7 63 19 18
7-8 46 14 12
8-9 72 3 9
9-10 51 2 7
10-11 39 9





16-17 1 1 1
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Socio-economic Variables
Previous bidding game studies, in particular, Randall 's9 Four
Corners air pollution study, have shown that certain socio-economic
variables will effect the recreationist's willingness to pay for aes-
thetic improvements. The regression model in this thesis included
linear, dummy, quadratic, and cross product parameters. Each socio-
economic variable was significant at the 95 percent confidence level.
The variables income, age, education, and number of years experience
entered the equation as linear terms; the respondent's sex, occupation,
and size of previous city of residence were significant dummy varia-
bles; the number of years the respondent has used the Poudre River for
his specific recreation activity entered as a quadratic. Together
these attributes explained 20 percent and 23 percent of the entrance
fee and sales tax fishing bid variation, 48 percent and 47 percent of
the entrance fee and sales tax shoreline bid variation, and 7 percent
to 14 percent of the entrance fee and sales tax white water bid varia-
tion.
The coefficient attached to the linear parameters measures the
change in willingness to pay associated with a small change in the
respective variable. The change, however, is not unit free. A one-
unit change in the independent variable changes the willingness to pay
by one dollar. The sign attached to the coefficient determines the
direction of the change. One word of caution: due to the heterogenous
nature of the shoreline group, the results from the shoreline models
should be used carefully.
9Randall, Ives, and Eastman, Ope cit., pp. 132-149.
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Income
Fishermen using the Poudre River have the highest mean income,
($18,200 for fishermen, $14,800 for shoreline, and $12,500 for white
water recreationists) statistically different from the other groups'
mean incomes. White water recreationists have the lowest mean income,
but it is not statistically different from the mean income of the sam-
ple shorelines or from the Fort Collins mean income. These results are
consistent with Walsh's reports of fishermen with large incomes and
kayakers with low incomes on other rivers in Co1orado. 10
Even though changes in the income distribution probably don't
change the aggregate marginal willingness to pay, income does effect
individual bids. A $1,000 increase in income causes the sales tax
fishing bid to increase by $.013 per day, the sales tax shoreline bid
to decrease by $.009 per day, and the entrance fee shoreline bid to
decrease by $.008 per day. Income does not effect the entrance fee
fishing and white water bids.
The magnitude of the change is relatively insignificant, but the
income coefficient signs suggest very important behavior patterns.
Fishing activities compared with shoreline activities require large
individual investments in terms of time and equipment. Perhaps income
in the shoreline model has a negative sign because low income indi-
viduals can't afford the costly fishing equipment, nor can they invest
the time into learning the skills needed for trout fishing. Thus,
shoreline recreation, and the instream flow for that activity, is one
of the few activities lower income individuals can enjoy. But, as the
10Richard G. Walsh, Ray K. Ericson, and Daniel J. Arosteguy, An
Em irica1 A 1ication of a Model for Estimatin the Recreational Value
of Instream Flow, Draft Completion Report No. A-036-COLO October 1978).
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individua1's income increases, he can afford to change his recreation
behavior switching from the simple low cost shoreline activity to
expensive trout fly fishing experiences.
An individua1's age does influence shoreline and white water
instream flow bids. White water participants are significantly younger
than recreationists in the other activities (white water mean age =
30.9, fishing mean age = 38.1, and shoreline mean age = 37.0). Younger
participants are willing to pay more for instream flow in white water
activities and less for instream flow in shoreline experiences. A year
increase in age increases the entrance fee, white water total bid by
$.062 per day, and it increases the sales tax, white water total bid by
$.055 per day. But, a year increase in age decreases the shoreline
total bid by $.07 per day. Age has a negative effect on white water
bids, but a positive effect on shoreline bids because the physical
effort the participant must make to enjoy the activities is quite dif-
ferent. Paddling a kayak against a strong flow requires large amounts
of strength, agility, and daring. These attributes usually reach a
peak at a young age. As one grows older and wiser, it may become
easier and more enjoyable to relax by the river bank.
Experience
The number of years the recreationist has invested in fishing or
white water activities will change his total willingness to pay for
instream flows. A year increase in experience increases the total bid
for instream flows in fishing activities by $.04 per day (entrance fee
game) or $.03 per day (sales tax game). More experience will increase
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white water, instream flow total bids by $.06 per day (entrance fee
game) and $.04 per day (sales tax game). The more years an individual
participates in an activity, the more he should enjoy it, producing a
higher value for the instream flows. But, the shoreline model experi-
ence coefficients are conflicting, since experience is positively
related to willingness to pay in the sales tax game while negatively
related in the entrance fee game. We have no explanation for that
anomaly.
Education
The education coefficients are also ambiguous. Similar to many
recreation studies, the average years of education are higher than the
national average. But, the education coefficient sign is negative,
suggesting that if an individual stays in school longer, he is willing
to pay less for instream flows.
Dummy Variables
Certain socio-economic variables cannot take values over some con-
tinuous range, rather they represent either-or qualitative facts.
Dummy variables are employed to account for the qualitative data's
influence on instream flow willingness to pay. Any single dummy varia-
ble can distinguish between only two characteristics, otherwise it
would introduce a scaling effect where the results would depend on the
specific scale for the dummy variable. Dummy variables described the
respondent's sex, occupation, employer, residence, and the site of the
color photographs.
The sex and occupation-employment dummy variables indicated that
women pay less for instream flow in fishing activities, but more for
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instream flow in shoreline activities. In the questions without occu-
pation variables, men bid more for fishing instream flow while women
bid more for shoreline instream flow. Occupation and employer varia-
bles model similar behavior in the final equations. Housewives, cleri-
cal workers, and retired individuals bid lower in the fishing models,
higher in the shoreline models. Skilled labor, manufacturing, and
financial variables modeled the opposite effect; higher in fishing
models, lower in shoreline models. As women increase their participa-
tion in fishing activities, the difference between male and female
willingness to pay is likely to become less significant.
The size of the recreator's former permanent residence, if they
now live in Fort Collins, helps determine willingness to pay. Willing-
ness to pay for instream flows in the production of fishing experiences
is inversely related to the population of the recreator's former resi-
dence. Those who move from rural areas may have a higher bid as they
attempt to retain the high quality fishing experience that they may
have been accustomed to in less populated areas. Conversely, shoreline
and white water instream flow bids are higher for individuals that
moved to Fort Collins from medium- and larger-size cities.
The site where the photographs were taken is not as important as
one might expect. All site dummies were insignificant in the shoreline
models. Fishing at Site 2, a seldom-fished spot, results in lower
instream flow fishing bids. White water bids for Site 4, an inappro-
priate kayaking and rafting reach of the river, were also lower. The
river channel varies enough, so that by moving a few hundred yards up




The recreationist1s bid could conceivably be a quadratic function
of income, age, or recreation days in addition to flow. But, only the
number of activity days in the Poudre River Canyon entered the
willingness-to-pay models as a quadratic variable. According to eco-
nomic theory the marginal effect of days on willingness to pay should
be positive but decreasing. The marginal utility of an additional day,
at the same instream flow level, should be worth less than the previous
one. The partial derivative of the total bid regression equation, with
respect to days, represents the marginal effect of activity days, or
abid
adays = blO + 2b (days).
where
blO is the coefficient on the linear days variable,
bg is the coefficient of (days)2,
bid is the total willingness to pay for some constant instream
flow quantity,
days represents the number of days the respondent spends in the
Poudre River for a particular recreation activity.
Tables 4-12 and 4-13 present the change in total willingness to pay for
instream flow given a specific number of recreation days in the Poudre
River Canyon for shoreline and white water activities. Both exhibit
normal diminishing marginal returns for additional activity days.
After approximately 11 days of shoreline recreation, an additional day
will not add anything to the willingness to pay for instream flows.
Similarly, after 22 days of white water recreation, an additional day
will not add to the recreationist1s marginal value of instream flows.
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Table 4-12. Marginal Effect of Number of Days Participation in the
Poudre River Canyon on the Instream Flow Total Bid,
Shoreline Activities, 1978.
Change in Total Change in Total
Willingness to Pay Willingness to Pay
No. of Days Entrance Fee Game Sales Tax Game
1 $ · 181 $ .129
2 ·161 .188












Table 4-13. Marginal Effect of Number of Days Participation in the















Change in Total Change in Total
Willingness to Pay Willingness to Pay
Entrance Fee Game Sales Tax Game













The impact of days on instream flow is slightly different for
fishing recreation. The marginal bid function with respect to days
increases. Individuals who fish over 31.5 days in the Poudre River
have a higher bid for each additional day. These intensive users have
satisfaction functions shaped so that the more days they can fish, the
greater is their marginal utility they receive from more instream flow.
Again, be cautious when applying these results. We. interviewed only four
households that fished over 30 days in one year and only one who fished
58 days.
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Table 4-14. Marginal Effect of Number of Days Participation in the
Poudre River Canyon on the Instream Flow Total Bid,
Fishing Activities, 1978.
Change in Total Change in Total
Willingness to Pay Willingness to Pay
No. of Days Entrance Fee Game Sales Tax Game
1 $ -.126 $ -. 17
5 - .109 -. 15












EVALUATING INSTREAM FLOW STRATEGIES
For years, Co1orado's water resource policy has encouraged farm-
ers, mine operators, and cities to appropriate and develop the state's
water supplies. Diverting water from streams, they substantially
increased farm crop production, expanded mineral extraction, and
improved municipal water services. Even though uses other than rec-
reation fully appropriated the South Platte, Arkansas, and Poudre
Ri vers nume,rous other mounta in ri vers rema i ned where the i nstream flow
supported excellent fishing and maintained the natural stream environ-
ment.
Today, Colorado residents demanding more recreation and amenities
are willing to sacrifice the outputs traditional from water uses. But,
how can Colorado allocate its scarce water supplies between all compet-
ing users? To answer that question, resource planners should look
toward a more general analysis that compares the economic non-market
instream flow recreation value with intermediate market value in other
productive uses and recognizes the interdependence between economic
outcomes and legal institutions.
The general economic analysis in this chapter, concerned with com-
munity or social welfare from different instream flow allocations,
examines the following three issues: 1) Since water is limited,
resource reallocations from one use will ultimately reduce the output
from some other use. The economist's familiar production possibility
curve highlights the economic tradeoffs between competing instream flow
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employments. 2) A static efficiency analysis ignores many temporal
problems. A general analysis looks at the possibility that today's
efficient allocation may not satisfy future water demands. 3) A com-
pletely general model combines economics with water right institutions.
Different water laws can change the actual water allocation and the
perceptions about the optimal allocation.
Water Resource Allocation and General Economic Eguilibrium
Policy decisions concerning alternative instream flow allocations
fall within the sub-discipline, welfare economics, that considers the
criteria for optimal allocation of goods and services in the economy.
Since water resources are limited, a general welfare analysis compares
the input and output decisions of all firms and individuals competing
for the resource, rather than analyzing each actor's isolated decision
making process. Water planners shouldn't consider instream flow allo-
cations in one sector independent of others. In some situations, to
expand one sector's output, another's must decrease; at other times,
expansion in one may cause output increases in another. The interde-
pendence depends on the physical relationships, the demand urgency, and
the production costs of all sectors using instream flows.
Irrigation, municipal, and recreation activities compete for the
Poudre River's flows. Water input decisions in each sector alter the
quantity, quality, time, and location characteristics of water, thereby
influencing the other sector's economic decision making process. To
conceptualize the problem, this section treats management of the Poudre
River as if a river basin firm were empowered to allocate instream flow
inputs between recreational fishing and irrigation production
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activities. The economic tool, production possibility curve (PPC-
Figure 6), illustrates fishing and irrigation output combinations the
basin firm can produce from a specific instream flow quantity and tech-
nology level. Points on the curve represent the maximum fishing and
irrigation outputs the basin can produce. This curve helps determine








Figure 6.~ Instream Flow Production Possibilities Curve.
Different instream flow allocations will at certain times and
locations lead to competitive, complementary, or supplementary rela-
tionships between fishing and irrigation. Along the section BC on
PPC1, fishing and irrigation compete for instream flows. Water trans-
fers from fishing to irrigation increase the fishing instream flow mar-
ginal product, while decreasing the irrigation instream flow marginal
product. For example, if the Poudre River instream flow falls below
500 cfs, irrigation diversion increases crop output but reduces fishing
return. Robert Smith suggested measuring three benefit components
before making the final allocation decision: 1
1. the private return from additional irrigation diversion;
2. the producer surplus the farmer may receive; and
3. the public fishing benefits from maintenance of instream flows.
This analysis identifies the consumer surplus each alternative must
generate before making the basin better off.
Recently, Martin, Tinney, and Gum2 used consumer and producer sur-
plus measures to compare private and public tradeoffs from land alloca-
tions in Arizona between cattle producers and hunting activities.
Since the consumer-producer surplus from cattle production was five
times the surplus in hunting activities, the economic analysis indi-
cated resource managers should allocate more land to cattle producers.
But, the analysis ignores many important distributional impacts from a
change in land allocations. Even though the private alternative war-
ranted more land inputs, the benefit accrues to a relatively small
group of ranchers; the loss is spread over numerous recreationists.
This difficult problem arises when one attempts to aggregate individual
consumer surplus. Does a reallocation that increases one group's con-
sumer surplus by $20, but reduces another group's consumer surplus by
$4, increase total social welfare by the net of $16? Answering this
question, the analysis assigns a weight to each individual consumer
surplus; but, what are the correct weights?
1Robert J. Smi th, II Prob1ems of Interpreti ng Recreati on Benefi ts
from a Recreation Demand Curve," Recreation, Economics and Analysis,
G. A. C. Searle (ed.) (New York: Longman Group Hd., 1975), p. 73.
2Wi11iam E. Martin, J. Craig Tinney, and Russell L. Gum, IIA
Welfare Economic Analysis of Potential Competition Between Hunting and
Cattle Ranching,1I Western Journal of A ricultura1 Economics, Vol. 3,
No.2 (December 1978 , pp. 87-97.
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values. For additional output, the basin must sacrifice successively
large amounts of recreation. In the spring, fishing and irrigation
complement each other (AB section of the PPC1). When Poudre River
instream flows exceed 500 cfs, incremental increases in irrigation
diversion produce more crops and make the fishing experience more
attractive. Along section CD, the basin outputs are supplements;
increasing fishing output doesn't reduce crop output. A supplementary
relationship in the Poudre River occurs in late fall, after the growing
season, when water allocation to fishing activities doesn't effect that
year's crop production.
The basin manager, moving resources from one output to another,
should carefully consider all economic and physical interrelationships.
If the basin has unlimited water resources or if all outputs are com-
plements and supplements, then the manager simply allocates the eco-
nomic optimum instream flow quantity to each activity as if it were the
only production activity. Water allocation in the Poudre River is more
difficult, because the flow is limited and outputs are usually competi-
tive. What economic theory can be used to deal with the entire basin's
welfare from water reallocations between irrigation and fishing?
Economists have recommended two objectives: (1) maximizing net
consumers and producers surplus and (2) satisfying the Pareto effi-
ciency conditions. The first requires reliable estimates of the
derived demand curve for instream flows producing irrigated crops and
fishing experiences. Given these functions, the basin manager compares
the area under each demand curve between the prospective price and
quantity changes, then allocates water to the output having the highest
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To avoid the interpersonal comparisons, the basin manager can use
the second general equilibrium tool, Pareto efficiency. An efficient
allocation exists if any reallocation increases some economic activity
while reduces another activity. Formally, an instream flow allocation
is efficient if no one can be made better off without making someone
else worse off. 3 This criterion, tactfully avoiding direct interper-
sonal consumer surplus comparisons, skillfully hides its own value
judgements: 1) the sum of individual tastes defines social welfare and
2) the initial endowment of resources was correct.
The basin firm, using the efficiency definition, will operate on
the production possibilities curve. An allocation at some position in
the interior of the ppe l is inefficient. Suppose the Poudre basin firm
produces crop irrigation (Y,) and fishing recreation (Y2), given an
instream flow quantity (X). The basin's objective is to maximize the
net return from each activity (V1Yl +V 2Y2) subject to the total instream
flow supply, where Yl = f,(X1) and Y2 = f 2(X-X l )
the first order condition for a maximum is
Thus, the basin will operate efficiently when the manager allocates
instream flows so that the net marginal benefits of flow in crop irri-
gation equals the net marginal benefits of flow in fishing experiences.
If the marginal returns are not equal, the basin is not operating
3Henderson and Quant, Ope cit.
9.4
efficiently. For example, if the fishing instream flow marginal return
is $10 and $6 for crop irrigation, then transferring one flow unit to
fishing activities increase the basin output by $4. Fishermen could
give irrigators $6, keeping them as well off as before the realloca-
tion, and still be better off by $4.
The Pareto equi-marginal principle provides the water resource
manager in Colorado a tool to analyze the tradeoff between allocations
for crop irrigation and fishing activities. Table 5-1 presents the
aggregate instream flow marginal benefits (per acre foot) for fishing
activities during each summer month. Marginal benefits vary each month
as the number of fishermen, willing to pay for instream flows according
to the bidding game results, increases from 68/activity days in June to
397/activity days in July and August. Table 5-2 presents the short-run
instream flow marginal benefits in crop production given two possible
water supply conditions. Estimated benefits from a farm model of the
Lower South Platte River valley in northeastern Colorado were available
to approximate the marginal benefits in the Poudre valley.4 The
approximation is judged to be quite accurate because the cropping and
irrigation practices are very similar. Even the precipitation is
almost identical. Note, even though Table 5-1 shows the entrance fee
and sal es tax game ma rgi na1 val ues, we wi 11 us e on1y the entrance fee
amounts when comparing fishing and irrigation benefits.,
Ffrst, to fulffll the Prato efficient conditions, the basin
manager should allocate instream flows into all complementary and
4John Daubert, "Conjunctive Ground and Surface Water Allocation:
The Economics of a Quasi-Market Solution," M.S. Thesis, Colorado State
University, Fort Collins, Colorado, Fall 1978.
Table 5-1. Aggregate rvlarginal Hillingness to Pay for Instream Flow in the Production of Recreational
Fishing Experiences by Month, Poudre River, 1978.
Entrance Fee Game Aggregate Marginal WTP/day (per acre foot)
Average over
Flow May June July August Sept. Oct. Season
(cfs ) $ $ $ $ $ $ $
50 7.72 3.96 23.21 23.21 11 .99 7.72 13.30
100 6.79 3.50 20.41 20.41 10.54 6.79 11 .71
150 5.85 3.02 17.61 17.61 9.09 5.85 10.13
200 4.92 2.54 14.81 14.81 7.65 4.92 8.54
250 4.06 2.09 12.21 12.21 6.30 4.06 6.95
300 3. 13 1.61 9.40 9.40 4.86 3. 13 5.37
350 2.20 1. 13 6.60 6.60 3.41 2.20 3.78 \D
400 1.26 .65 3.80 3.80 1.96 1.26 2.19 (n
450 .33 . 17 1.00 1.00 .52 .33 .61
500 -.60 -.31 -1.80 -1.80 -.93 -.60 -.98
550 -1.46 -.75 -4.40 -4.40 -2.27 -1.46 -2.56
600 -2.40 -1.23 -7.20 -7.20 -3.72 -2.40 -4.15
650 -3.33 -1 .71 -10.01 -10.01 -5. 17 -3.33 -5.74
700 -4.26 -2. 19 -12.81 -12.81 -6.61 -4.26 -7.32
No. of
Fisherman/ day1 132 68 397 397 205 132 228
Tabl e ,5-1 . Continued
Sales Tax Game Aggregate Marginal WTP/day (per acre foot)
Average over
Flow May June July August Sept. Oct. Season
(cfs ) $ $ $ $ $ $ $
50 10.65 5.48 32.02 32.02 16.53 10.65 18.44
100 9.65 4.97 29.01 29.01 14.98 9.65 16.64
150 8.58 4.42 25.81 25.81 13.33 8.58 14.85
200 7.58 3.91 22.81 22.81 11.78 7.58 13.05
250 6.52 3.36 19.61 19.61 10. 12 6.52 11 .26
300 5.46 2.81 16.41 16.41 8.47 5.46 9.46
350 4.46 2.30 13.41 13.41 6.92 4.46 7.67
400 3.39 1.75 10.21 10.21 5.27 3.39 5.87 ~
450 2.33 1.20 7.00 7.00 3.62 2.33 4.40 ~
500 1.33 .69 4.00 4.00 2.07 1.33 2.27
550 .27 .14 .80 .80 .4' .27 .47
600 -.73 -.38 -2.20 -2.20 -1 .14 -.73 -1.32
650 -1.80 -.93 -5.40 -5.40 -2.79 -1.80 -3.11
700 -2.86 -1.47 -8.60 -8.60 -4.44 -2.86 -4.91
No. of
Fisherman/dayl 132 68 397 397 205 132 228
1Interview with James W. Carlson, District Ranger, Arapahoe and Roosevelt National Forest, Fort Collins,
Colorado, December 1978.

























supplementary production activities until the reallocation changes to
a competitive relationship. The reasonining is straightforward. A
complementary relationship is inefficient, since reallocations exist
which improve welfare in both sectors. A supplementary relationship
is inefficient, since at least one individual's welfare will increase
without a decrease in another's welfare position.
During certain times and at specific locations, diversion for crop
irrigation will complement or supplement trout fishing experiences. In
May, June, and July, when the average instream flow at the Poudre River
Canyon mouth exceeds 450 cfs (775,1,542, and 703 cfs, respectively),
fishing and irrigation become complementary basin outputs. Incremental
increases in irrigation diversions, during those months, increase the
basin's crop production by $1.75/af, $3.30/af, and $9.00/af given nor-
mal flow conditions, and even more if drought conditions prevai~. The
diversions also increase instream flow fishing value by at least
$4.26/af, $2.l9/af, and $12.8l/af. Pareto efficiency dictates that the
basin manager increase irrigation diversions at least until the two
products become competitive. In October, fishing and irrigation become
supplementary outputs. Since that year's growing season is over, mar-
ginal value of instream flow for crop irrigation equals zero. Leaving
more flow in the river, the basin manager could increase fishing output
by $6.79/af (October's average flow is 124 cfs) without reducing that
year's crop output.
Even without this study, the economic supplementary and comple-
mentary output possibilities in the Poudre River basin are fairly
obvious. But as fishing and crop irrigation become competitive out-
puts, water allocation decisions assume a new dimension; reallocating
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flow will increase one output only at the expense of the other.
According to the equi-marginal principal, the basin manager will maxi-
mize that social return to instream flows when the marginal return in
fishing equals the marginal return in crop irrigation. Existing
instream flow allocations, in August, seem efficient. The marginal
return to crop irrigation is $15/af, in a normal year, approximately
equal to the fishing marginal return of $14.81/af given the average
instream flow of 218 cfs.
But, in September, current basin management practices may not
allocate instream flow resources efficiently. The average year
instream flow at the canyon mouth, 105 cfs, results in a marginal fish-
ing return equal to $10.54/af and a marginal crop return equal to
$7.22/af. To fulfill the efficiency conditions, the Poudre River
instream flow should be 200 cfs where the marginal returns in both uses
are approximately equal. (Marginal fishing return = $7.68/af, marginal
crop irrigation return = $7.22/af.)
Basin managers, changing storage reservoir management from a com-
petitive to a complementary or supplementary relationship, could
improve some of the direct flow allocation efficiency to some degree.
Many irrigation companies begin filling high mountain storage reser-
voirs in September and plains reservoirs in the spring. In fact, they
store over 1,000 af in high mountain reservoirs in September and 2,000
af in October that could have augmented the river's normal flow by 33
af/day and 66 af/day.5 In September, additional instream flow is worth
5Robert Aukerman, William T. Springer, and James F. Judge, Inven-
tory of Colorado's Front Range Mountain Reservoirs, Colorado State
University Environmental Resources Center, Information Series No. 23, .
May 1977.
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approximately $lO/af to the fisherman, and approximately $7/af in
October. Transferring the timing of reservoir storage water rights
between high mountain and plains reservoirs changes a competitive re1a-
tionship into a complementary relationship. Basin welfare increases by
$10/af and $7/af for fishing as water runs down the stream into plains
reservoirs in the fall, and in the spring high mountain storage reduces
instream flows also increasing the fishing experience value.
Reallocating water supplies from high mountain reservoirs to
plains reservoirs could substantially increase total benefits from
basin water use in the fall. For example, if the basin let the 1,000
af stored in September flow downstream into plains reservoirs, then
total fishing benefits would increase by $380/day or approximately
$lO,OOO/mo. In October, another major high mountain reservoir,
Chambers Lake, stores approximately 20/af per day.6 Total basin bene-
fits would increase by at least $11,000 in October.
This water right dramatically increases fishing basin benefits
without decreasing next year's crop output. Water remains the same,
only the timing changes. (Note that all seepage and evaporation losses
must be accounted for.)
This general analysis helps highlight the efficiency tradeoffs
between instream flow for crop irrigation and recreational fishing
experiences; but it limits the analysis to the production possibilities
frontier. Along that frontier all efficient allocations differ with
respect to the output distribution. The Poudre River is not a basin
firm, instead, distinct groups enjoy the benefits from different
6John Neutz, District Hater Commissioner, Fort Collins, Colorado,
persona1 i ntervi ew. (March. 1979)
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instream flow allocations. The economist can only present the sacri-
fices society must make as it moves from one efficient allocation to
another; the political system must subsequently decide the best point
on the curve.
Future Instream Flow Values
Static Pareto analysis describes an efficient natural resources
allocation if current consumption of the resource service flow does not
effect future flows, and if consumption benefits or losses can not be
transferred forward or backward in time. 7 For example, water for irri-
gation use in one period doesn't deplete the future service flow, nor
can the farmer transfer service flows into another period, with the
exception of small storage possibilities. The water right owner not
consuming the service flow loses that period's specific water services,
and must wait until the next period's replacement runoff. In princi-
pal, irrigation diversion in the Poudre River basin doesn't involve
intertemporal problems; efficient allocations occur independently in
each period where the marginal social cost equals the marginal social
benefit or until the irrigator fully diverts the water supplies.
Once the basin considers instream flows as final consumption
goods, providing amenity and recreational inputs into a consumer's
household production, a static analysis may suggest inappropriate water
resource allocations. Basin allocation decisions today may change
future consumption benefits. Before one can learn to fish, a minimum
flow must exist and be accessible. Changes in the river flow may shift
the level of future demand. In addition, basin decisions that preclude
7John McInerney, "The Simple Analytics of Natural Resource Eco-
nomics," Journal of Agricultural Economics (January 1976), pp. 31-52.
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the instream service flow, say constructing a dam on the Poudre River
to increase irrigation storage supplies, introduce irreversible trans-
formations and significant intertemporal allocation problems.
Cicchetti, Seneca, and Davidson suggested that an increase in
recreation supply might cause a positive change in demand. 8 Inaccessi-
ble facilities tend to decrease recreation participation rates. For
example, when the Poudre River instream flow falls below the level
needed for productive fishery, area residents must travel large dis-
tances before they find a quality fishing alternative. Recreationists
unable to afford the travel costs may still use the Poudre River, but
for recreational purposes other than fishing. However, if the basin
increases the minimum river instream flow to a quality fishery, then
fishing activities become more accessible, encouraging shoreline rec-
reationists to participate in fishing activities. Since fishermen tend
to value instream flow more, the willingness to pay increases.
Fishing activities also require higher skill levels than shoreline
activities. Skills that individuals develop only if quality recreation
facilities are nearby. Again, as the basin manager provides instream
flows for fishing, the opportunity to upgrade fishing skills increases.
Instream flows for fishing tends to increase the number of partici-
pants, plus as individuals improve their fishing skills, instream flows
benefits become even larger.
The household production model, adopting the notion that house-
hold's combine market and non-market inputs to produce commodities, can
explain why instream flow supply increases changes instream flow
8Charles J. Cicchetti, J. S. Seneca, and P. Davidson, The Demand
and Supply of Outdoor Recreation: An Econometric Analysis, Bureau of
Economics Research, Rutgers, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1969.
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valuation. 9 Instream flow management for fishing, reducing the travel
cost to quality fishing locations, causes the implicit instream flow
price to fall. The rational recreationist reacting to the price reduc-
tion shifts production toward corrmodities that intensively use instream
flow (shoreline recreation to fishing activities) and shifts toward
production technologies that use relatively more instream flow (fishing
to fly fishing activities). Production theory indicates that the larger
the elasticity of substitution between instream flow as water input, the
more instream flow the recreationist demands.
Similarily, a rise in the marginal product of instream flows,
holding factor prices constant, shifts demand. The recreationist mini-
mizing production costs uses more instream flows in the production
process, thereby reducing the relative cost of fishing experiences.
Because his relative income has increased, the fisherman demands more
of all commodities having a positive income elasticity. The water
resource planner ignoring these intertemporal demand shifts may bias
allocations toward irrigation away from recreation.
Development of Storage Reservoirs
Even more difficult are the intertemporal decisions involving
irreversible changes in the environment. This period's decision allo-
cating instream flow for recreation or irrigation withdrawal is
reversible. The water resource planner can correct the faulty decision
by changing the allocation in the next production and instream flow
regime. However, a change from using the Poudre River for free-flowing
recreation activities and irrigation, into using the Poudre River
9Michael and Becker, op. cit., p. 363.
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Canyon as a storage reservoir for flat water recreation and irrigation
is irreversible. Once a storage decision is made the opportunity
costs, benefits from a free-flowing stretch of the Poudre River, become
permanent. To make this decision, the water planner needs a model
showing the gain or loss in future consumption and production benefits
from the Poudre River in both uses, and reflecting the changing demand
growth rates for instream flows in each use.
Krutilla and Fisher have proposed a dynamic model comparing cur-
rent and future development or preservation. 10 The objective is to
maximize:
max
subject to constraints on total available water flows, that the devel-





B~ = the preservation benefits in period t,
B~ = the development benefits in period t,
Pt = free-flowing water supplies,
10Krutilla and Fisher, Ope cit., pp. 39-78.
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Dt = storage water development,
It = investment cost,
8t = discount factor, and
W= total water supplies.
This function traces out the optimal time path of resource development.
Preservation is the optimal solution if net development benefits turn
T 0
out negative [~8t(Bt-Iu)]. ·If they are positive, then the planner
should compare both water use growth rates. When development benefits
grow slower than preservation benefits, the decision to preserve
remains optimal. Table 5~3 presents future instream flow preservation
benefits. The growth rate is approximately 8 percent, while the irri-
gation real growth rate has fluctuated between 10 and 1 percent per
year. ll Note, this analysis ;s only an example. A thorough analysis
would include the effect of potential congestion on the Poudre River
as use doubles. The congestion imposes a disuti1ity on the fisherman
reducing his marginal willingness-to-pay relationship. In any event,
the dynamic model reflecting the growth in demand for natural environ-
ments accentuates the problems concerning resource use through time.
Instream Flow Legal Strategies and the Economic Implications
Most Colorado residents agree that the state should manage the
Poudre River for both recreational and irrigation activities. Even the
farmer depending on water for crop irrigation understands the need to
leave some flow in stream to support aquatic life. But, few agree on
the exact amount of minimum flow, or on the legal institutions needed
l1 USDA , Economics, Statistics, and Cooperatives Service, State
Farm Income Statistics Supplement Bulletin to No. 609 (September 1978),
p. 18.
Tabl e ,6-3. Future Instream Flow (Fishing) Aggregate Marginal Value Schedules, Poudre River, 1978. 1
Entrance Fee Game
CFS 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
-----------------------------------------($/acre foot)-----------------------------------------
50 13.22 14.38 15.60 . 16.76 17.92 19.08 20.30 21.52 22.68 23.84 25.00
100 11.63 12.65 13.72 14.74 15.76 16.78 17.85 18.92 19.94 20.96 21.98
150 10.03 10.91 11.84 12.72 13.60 14.48 15.40 16.30 17.20 18.08 18.96
200 8.49 9. 18 9.95 10.69 11.43 12.17 12.95 13.73 14.47 15.21 15.95
250 7.07 7.69 8.34 8.96 9.58 10.20 10.85 11 .50 12. 12 12.75 13.36 -a
300 5.47 5.96 6.46 6.84 7.42 7.90 8.40 8.90 9.38 9.86 10.34
CJ)
350 3.88 4.22 4.58 4.91 5.25 5.59 5.95 6.31 6.65 6.99 7.33
400 2.28 2.48 2.69 2.89 3.09 3.29 3.50 3.71 3.91 4. 11 4.31
450 .68 .74 .81 .87 .93 .99 1.05 1. 11 1. 17 1.23 1.29
500 -1 . 14 -1.24 -1.34 -1.44 -1.55 -1.65 -1.75 -1.86 -1 .96 -2.06 -2.16
1Future instream flow growth rates for fishing assuming a linear trend (.in 1978 prices} ..
Tabl e -5-3. Continued
Sales Tax Game
CFS 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
-----------------------------------------($/acre foot)-----------------------------------------
50 18.24 19.84 21.52 23. 12 24.72 26.32 28.00 29.68 31.28 32.88 34.48
100 16.64 18. 10 19.64 21.09 22.56 24.02 25.55 27.08 28.54 30.00 31 .46
150 14.82 16.12 17.49 18.79 20.09 21.39 22.75 24.12 25.42 26.72 28.02
200 12.99 14.13 15.33 16.47 17.61 18.75 19.95 21 . 15 22.29 23.43 24.57
250 11 . 17 12. 15 13. 18 14.16 15. 14 16.12 17. 15 18.18 19.16 20.14 21 .12
--"
0
300 9.35 1O. 17 11 .03 11.85 12.67 13.49 14.35 15.21 16.03 16.85 17.61 ."'-J
350 8.66 9.42 10.22 10.98 11.74 12.50 13.30 14.10 14.86 15.62 16.38
400 5.93 6.45 6.99 7.51 8.03 8.55 9.10 9.65 10.17 10.69 11 .21
450 4.10 4.46 4.84 5.20 5.56 5.92 6.30 6.68 7.04 7.39 7.76
500 2.28 2.48 2.69 2.89 3.09 3.29 3.50 3.71 3.91 4. 11 4.31
540 .46 .50 .54 .58 .62 .66 .70 .74 .78 .82 .86
600 -1.37 -1.49 -1 .61 -1.73 -1.86 -1.97 -2.10 -2.23 -2.35 -2.47 -2.59
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to set the minimum instream flow level. Economic theory, helping to
determine the instream flow value, may lead to inappropriate solutions
unless the researcher considers the legal regulations. Nor can legal
solutions exist independent from economic considerations.
Different property right institutions structuring the bargaining
process between private water right owners and public recreation inter-
ests may generate different minimum flow outcomes. 12 For example,
assume individual A owns private property rights to divert all the
stream flow, while individual B would like more instream flow for rec-
reaction. If A refuses to permit a minimum flow at the price B offers,
the analyst might say the outcome, complete instream flow diversion, is
optimal. Next, assume B has property rights to all instream flow. If
A cannot persuade B to let him use some instream flow for crop irriga-
tion, then the same analyst might conclude that the instream flow level
B sets is optimal. Each property right structure resulted in different
notions concerning the ideal instream flow level.
According to the Coase Theorem, however, economic negotiations
between irrigators and fishermen generate optimal instream flow alloca-
tions regardless of the property right institutions. 13 Irrigators,
owning property rights to instream flow, should be indifferent between
income from irrigated crop production or payments for instream flow
from fishermen. Similarly, fishermen should be indifferent between
benefits from a quality fishery and damage payments from irrigators.
The Coase Theorem does, however, assume the bargaining takes place
l2E. J. Mishan, liThe Economics of Disamenity," Natural Resources
Journal (January 1974), pp. 55-86.
l3R. H. Coase, liThe Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and
Economics (October 1960), pp. 1-44.
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between two parties each having unique marginal instream benefits func-
tions and no transaction costs.
The Poudre River instream flow allocation problem violates the
Coasian assumptions. Instream flows serve as private good inputs into
the irrigator's crop production, and as public good inputs into the
fishermen's consumption of recreational experiences. The bargaining
process involves a single irrigator, on one side, and as many as 40,000
fishermen on the other side. The analyst should expect the non-zero
transaction costs to influence the water allocation outcome.
The public good characteristic also causes a non-unique recreation
benefit function that depends on the water rights distribution. Prop-
erty rights forcing the collective group, fishermen, to pay for
instream flow services result in a minimum instream flow level differ-
ent from the level produced by a right structure forcing the individual
irrigator to bid water resources away from fishermen. In the first
case, individual income limits the willingness to pay for instream
flow. In the second case, each fisherman has a reservation price to
sell, willingness to accept compensation, that income doesn't con-
strain. Since the fisherman may not have a unique marginal benefit
function, economics and the legal institutions interact to allocate
instream flows.
Colorado's specific instream flow regulations fit within one of
Bromley-Ca1abresi and Melamed entitlement categories: property rules,
liability rules, and inalienable rights. 14 ,15 Under a property rule,
14Danie1 W. Bromley, "property Rules, Liability Rules, and Envi-
ronmental Economics," Journal of Economic Issues (March 1978).
l5Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed, "property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral ," Harvard Law
Review (April 1972), pp. 1089-1128.
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B cannot interfere with A's resource ownership unless B has A's con-
sent. Liability rules permit B to interfere with A's ownership, but he
must later compensate A for the loss. Under an inalienable right, B
cannot, given any circumstances, interfere with A.
Each legal entitlement has an associate economic transaction cost.
Property rules have relatively large transactions costs, since inter-
ested parties must bargain prior to any action. Liability rules have
somewhat lower transaction costs, since actions can occur with only the
knowledge that compensation must be made at a later date. Inalienable
rights have infinite transactions costs, since they prevent any
resource reallocations.
Different economic goods, also, have an associated transaction
cost. Private goods have a small transaction cost, because interested
parties can bargain through the market place rather than face to face.
Public goods are characterized by high transaction cost, since a large
number of individuals have an interest in the allocation. Public goods
have additional non-rival characteristics that prevent a low cost mar-
ket system.
Because high transaction costs hinder Coasian efficient and neu-
tral trading solutions, certain legal entitlements work better for cer-
tain economic goods. Property rules efficiently allocate private goods
consumers trade in the market place, and inefficiently allocate public
goods that impact a large number of individuals. Liability rules per-
mit action to proceed with later compensation and transactions costs
and may aid efficient reallocation of public good resources. Inaliena-
ble rights best regulate those economic actions resulting in the loss
in human life.
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The overriding entitlement, in Colorado, allocating water
resources is the doctrine of prior appropriation. This doctrine allo-
cates water resources, separate from the adjacent land, according to
use and priority. Any individual having a beneficial use for water
(including domestic, municipal, power, and recreation) may apply for a
water entitlement. Whenever appropriations on a stream exceed water
supplies, each water entitlement holder receives water according to
his temporal priority. Senior appropriators having the highest pri-
ority (earliest application date) divert water first, followed by
junior appropriators having later application dates. The appropriation
doctrine establishes a full property rule. Junior appropriators cannot
interfere with a senior water right unless he gains consent or pur-
chases the right.
Irrigation companies, in the Poudre River system, supplying water
to local farmers and area municipalities, own senior rights to all
Poudre River instream flow. Fishermen, wanting a minimum flow, have to
pursuade irrigation companies to divert less water, purchase water
rights, or be content with the existing flow allocation. Fishermen
might be able to pursuade a few environmentally-conscious farmers to
divert less, but the minimum flow is still subject to the farmer1s
self-interest. Allocations according to the strict appropriation doc-
trine are equally inappropriate. Since the appropriation doctrine
allocates water flows using a priority data established over 50 years
ago, today1s changing social needs can cause the historical distribu-
tion to become inefficient.
Without some mechanism to transfer water rights to the highest
marginal value, the appropriate doctrine sacrifices economic efficiency
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to assure the legal security of senior right owners. Burness and
Quirk16 showed that 1) an equal sharing of water produces a larger
social output than an allocation following the appropriation doctrine,
and 2) the appropriation doctrine in combination with a competitive
market for water rights produces an efficient water allocation. Fol-
lowing the Coasian tradition the market outcome should also be neutral
with respect to the initial rights structure.
Instream flow reallocations between irrigators and recreationists
defy simple market solutions. The appropriation doctrine is a property
rule that works well only if interested parties can meet before any
interference. Water rights markets enabling parties to meet in the
market place rather than face to face lower transactions costs, thus
encourage efficient water exchanges. Colorado has a somewhat efficient
market exchange system for transactions between two irrigators, but
even the market doesn't help resource allocation under a property rule
when many individuals have an interest in prospective transfer. The
public good characteristics of instream flow for recreation forces the
water managers to consider changes in both the economic and legal allo-
cation institutions.
How can Colorado appropriately allocate stream flow for both irri-
gation and recreation? One legal alternative is to place a high
priority on a minimum flow recreation right. This changes the appro-
priation doctrine property rule to an inalienable right. During water
shortages or periods with low flow, recreation would have priority over
irrigation users that must stop diverting as the instream flow falls
l6H. S. Burness and J. P. Quirk, "Appropriative Water Rights and
the Efficient Allocation of Resources," American Economic Review (March
1979), pp. 25-37.
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toward the statutory minimum. Undoubtedly, a statutory minimum can
protect recreation and aesthetic interests, but in Colorado the solu-
tion is politically infeasible and, at times, inefficient. A statutory
minimum flow level would require a constitutional change in the exist-
ing appropriation system. The costs of this change probably outweigh
the benefits. A statutory minimum also limits future exchange possi-
bilities. Without provision for exchange the inalienable minimum flow
right places an infinite value of instream flows for recreation.
Referring back to Tables 5-1 and 5-2, instream recreation has value but
not close to infinity. When drought conditions prevail, marginal bene-
fit for crop irrigation for all flow levels exceed marginal benefits
for recreation. Assuming away any irreversibility problems, economic
efficiency indicates that stream flow should satisfy irrigation needs.
Rather than establish a statutory minimum flow, the Colorado leg-
islature passed Senate Bill 97 giving Co1orado's Water Conservation
Board power to apply for instream flow rights "sufficient to preserve
the natural environment to a reasonable degree. 11 17 Applying for a
junior water right on a stream already overappropriated might seem use-
less except for the no injury provision inherent the appropriation doc-
trine. The existing right owner cannot change his water right location
or use, if that change injures other junior or senior water rights.
Even as an extremely junior right owner, the Conservation Board can
object to water exchanges that may injure its recreation instream flow
use. Specifically, the Board could block water transfers that change a
downstream diversion point to an upstream diversion point.
17Nelson, Horak, and Lewis, Ope cit., pp. 14-18.
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For example, the Board could have used Senate Bill 97 to protect
minimum flow in the Ricardo Creek, originating in the Sangre de Cristo
Mountains. 18 The creek provides stream flow for the Colorado Fuel and
Iron Company (CF&I), and a home to a rare Rio Grande River Cutthroat
trout. CF&I planned to move the diversion point up high in the moun-
tains. The Board having a junior right could have prevented the trans-
fer, since the change in the diversion point would drastically injure
the State's junior water right.
State fish and wildlife supporters find Senate Bill 97 very
attractive. Conservation agencies can directly protect instream flows
without needing to purchase the water. The only cost is the applica-
tion fee to appropriate stream flow.
Senate Bill 97 and the no injury proviso was effective in the
Ricardo Creek example, but the same provision may limit other efficient
water transfers. One strategy increasing instream flow for recreation
in the Poudre River requires changing the current timing of irrigation
reservoir storage. Currently, operators of some high mountain reser-
voirs begin storing water for next year's crop production in the fall,
while plains reservoirs store in the spring. Tables 5-1 and 5-2 showed
that in September, marginal fishing instream benefit exceeds either
September's irrigation benefits, or next year's average irrigation mar-
ginal value. Ignoring transmission losses, the State could store fall
stream runoff in reservoirs downstream from recreation sites and some
spring runoff in high mountain reservoirs. Total water storage for
crop irrigation would remain the same and only the timing and location
would change. But, the same no-injur~ provision protecting the State's
18 Ibid ., p. 15.
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junior right to Ricardo Creek instream flow prevents any exchange
between reservoirs, if the transfer injures any other water right own-
ers.
Even though Colorado·s appropriation doctrine permits water trans-
fers, the no-injury provision limits many market exchanges. 19 Forcing
potential water uses, wanting to purchase water rights, to first prove
that the transfer will not injure other users, explicitly increases the
exchange transaction costs. Unless the marginal benefit of water in
the new use exceeds the marginal benefits in the old use plus the
transaction costs the exchange will not take place. Property rules
become even more restrictive, higher transaction costs, when the
exchange involves recreation activities that have numerous interested
participants.
Given the property rule governing water use, the most promising
strategy involves purchasing or leasing instream flow water rights.
This strategy, directly providing instream flow for recreation and aes-
thetic purposes, has a major cost constraint. In 1977, the Colorado
Division of Wildlife budgeted $500,000 to purchase flow rights, that
same year, they spent $18,000 for 1 cfs in Boulder Creek--water is
expensive. 20 Leasing, in some situations, might be one alternative.
The State can, however, defray part of the acquisition costs by selling
or leasing its water right to uses down stream from the major recrea-
tion sites where the instream flow value is small.
19C. Dirck Ditwiler, "Water Problems and Property Rights-An
Economic Perspective, I. Natural Resources Journal (October 1975), pp.
663-670.
20Nelson, Horak, and Lewis, Ope cit., p. 44.
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The Pareto optimal model showed that an efficient stream flow
allocation exists if the marginal benefits of instream flow for fishing
recreation equals the marginal benefits in crop production. Krutilla's
dynamic model altered this conclusion to account for natural resource
irreversibilities. But, economics alone cannot solve the instream flow
allocation problem. Economists must remember that their models are
only an abstraction of reality. Two-party competition models may not
completely describe a world having large transactions costs, public
goods, unequal income distributions, and different property institu-
tions. Instream flow allocation outcomes where consumption uses must
bid away flows from producers are different from the outcome where
irrigators must buy water from recreationists. Appropriate prescrip-
tive economics models should look at the economic and legal interrela-
tionships.
Without complete economic and social welfare specifications, there
is no optimal instream flow optimal solution. Instead, each recommen-
dation will have advantages and disadvantages according to different
social objectives. Certain legal-economic solution will favor produc-
tion activities, others will favor consumers, and still others will be
neutral. However, a legal-economic analysis should aid resource deci-





The Problem - In Colorado, economic and legal systems allocating
water encouraged farmers, industries, and cities to acquire then
develop stream flow to the extent that on many rivers those uses may
legally divert most, if not all, water flow from the river. Until
recently this strategy was beneficial; water resources for stream
recreation activities were readily available compared to water sources
for withdrawal uses. Diverting water from the river transferred water
having a small value in recreation at the margin into withdrawal uses
having a large marginal value.
Today, major economic conflicts are arising between withdrawal and
instream flow water use. Many individuals demanding more recreation
and amenity goods are willing to pay for water reallocations away from
traditional uses. Increases in mobility, leisure time, and income
cause water recreation, especially free-flowing stream activities, to
assume a greater importance to the State's economy and the general
population's welfare. Properly controlled instream flows can produce
a quality recreation experience that provides direct utility to recrea-
tionists and indirect income support to Colorado's major tourist indus-
try. Thus, instream water resources now have economic benefits large
enough to justify minimum flow management strategies.
But, how can Colorado's water resource managers allocate limited
water supplies between all possible users? Economic theory of optimal
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resource allocation supplies one framework to resolve conflicts where
water use in one capacity precludes its use in another. The theory
calls for a stream flow allocation between competing users that pro-
duces the greatest net social benefit. Since stream runoff becomes
available each year at zero cost (excluding reservoir storage),
resource managers should reallocate stream flow until the net marginal
return is the same for alternative uses. l Young and Gray provide
detailed information on the marginal value of water for withdrawal. 2
But, water managers still lack defensible instream flow benefit estima-
tions.
Economists usually rely on the private market system to reveal
appropriate marginal values. However, most water allocations occur
outside the market place. Even if society wanted the market to allo-
cate instream flows and stream-based recreation activities, the collec-
tive goods characteristic of instream water resources would hinder
normal market transactions. Increased instream flow to one recreation-
ist means more flow for all participants. Private producers can't
package and sell just one flow unit to a single consumer. Even if they
could, since the marginal cost of providing water to an additional rec-
reationist up to the congestion point is zero, society benefits from
public provision.
In the absence of market prices, conventional economic observation
of consumer behavior will not lead to instream flow value estimates.
Instead, the researcher alters existing methods or creates new models
to impute synthetic economic values to instream flow water resources.
lHirshleifer, DeHaven, and Milliman, Ope cit., p. 38.
2Young and Gray, Ope cit.
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Since water resource managers usually make decisions between incremen-
tal additions or subtractions to existing flow levels, the correct eco-
nomic guide is marginal net benefits--equal to the maximum amount a
recreationist would pay to have the flow change, rather than do without.
First attempts valuing non-market water uses focused on the bene-
fits associated with a specific recreation activity and/or recreation
site. Even though these studies revealed the social worth of certain
recreation experiences, they sidestepped Colorado's instream flow prob-
lem. Water resource planners need information concerning water's mar-
ginal value as an input into a recreation activity, not the value of
the experience itself. Policies involving changes in the existing
water allocation require objective estimates about the marginal value
of additional instream flows in a recreation experience.
The Study Area - Withdrawal and instream users compete for water
on all Colorado's rivers, but the conflicts are especially evident on
the Cache la Poudre River in northeastern Colorado. The Poudre River
Canyon is an extremely popular recreation area. During spring and
early summer when the stream runoff is high, the river provides excel-
lent white water rapids for kayakers and rafters. For those who like
to fish, the Poudre River combines temperature, turbidity, and flow
attributes to produce an excellent Rainbow and Brown trout fishery. In
addition, over 100,000 recreationists visited the canyon to enjoy the
picturesque mountain environment.
But, farmers have diverted stream flow from the Poudre River for
irrigation since 1864. The State, over the past 100 years, decreed
water rights to farmers and cities in excess of 4,000 cfs. Since the
average summer flow seldom exceeds 700 cfs, farmers can literally
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eliminate any instream recreation activity. Only since 1976 has
Colorado attempted to manage water flows for recreation.
Objectives - Individuals responsible for recreation management
have long known that water-based recreation has a large economic value,
and have wanted to maintain a minimum instream flow level. But, they
lacked enough specific information on water's marginal value in recrea-
tional activities to defend any management strategy. This research
focuses, first, on the economic valuation of instream flows for recrea-
tion purposes. The resulting estimates of economic benefits, designed
to be comparable and commensurate with values in withdrawal uses,
reflect the recreationist1s willingness to pay for incremental
increases in the stream flow level. The second objective is to iden-
tify the economic and legal components necessary to evaluate alterna-
tive water storage investments or minimum instream flow management
strategies. Economic solutions may lead to inappropriate conclusions,
unless the analyst considers the legal institutions governing water
allocations.
Procedure - A contingent valuation approach directly estimates the
recreationist's willingness to pay for instream flow quantity changes. 3
The technique creates a hypothetical water market that confronts the
recreationist with an array of instream quantities, and records the
recreationist's maximum paYment for each specific quantity change,
rather than do without. The procedure measures instream flow1s net
contribution to the recreation activity and not the total value of the
experience itself. Since it focuses on incremental changes in the
3Randall and Brookshire, Ope cit.
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stream flow level, it provides surrogate dollar values water resource
planners can compare with water value in withdrawal use.
The model assumes that willingness to pay is inversely related to
an instream flow quantity index and other economic variables:
The variable, WIpc , representing the household's willingness to pay to
obtain some increase in the stream flow level, estimates the Hicksian
compensating surplus. The variable, Fj , represents the cubic feet per
second water flow at the observation site. The variable, T, models
each individuals' recreation tastes and preferences. And the variable,
Sk' represents differences in the depth, velocity, aesthetic quality,
and fishing quality at each observation site. An ordinary least-
squares approach estimated the statistical parameters.
This research used an iterative bidding game similar to the one by
Randall, et~. on aesthetic improvements in the Four Corners Region
(southwestern United States) to obtain contingent instream flow bene-
fits. 4 The survey approach included:
1. color photographs of eight different instream flow rates at
four different sites in the Poudre River Canyon,
2. detailed fishery and hydrologic data at each flow level and
site combination,
3. two well-defined hypothetical situations (an entrance fee and
a sales tax payment vehicle), and
4. a series of iterative bidding game questions where the
respondent indicated his maximum paYment to obtain the
instream flow quantity change.
4Randall, Ives, and Eastman, Ope cit.
To collect the willingness to pay and other economic information,
thi s research surveyed 134 househo1ds us i,ng the Poudre. Ri ver for
stream recreation activities during summer 1978. The sample included
49 fishermen (fly, lure, or bait), 45 shoreline recreationists (those
participating in camping, hiking, viewing, and other non-contact stream
activities), and 40 white water enthusiasts (kayakers, rafters, and
tubers). Weestimated a benefit function for each activity. The reader
should be cautious about shoreline results due to the heterogeneous
nature of that group.
To assure a representative and random sample, the interviewer sampled
random days during each month at different sites in the Canyon. Even
though the survey often took nearly an hour to complete, the acceptance
rate was over 80 percent. Fishermen and shoreline recreationists were
the easiest to interview and the most receptive, only 19 and 7 percent
refusing to be interviewed. However, kayakers and rafters often
objected to the process, 38 percent refusing the interview. Although
a personal interview technique is costly, the interviewer can eliminate
many misunderstandings about the hypothetical bidding game process,
making the extra precision worth the extra costs.
Conclusions
The objective of this research is to present the economic factors
associated with setting minimum flow regulations on Colorado streams.
Five major conclusions flow from that objective.
1. ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES OF THE TOTAL INSTREAM FLOW BID
FUNCTION FOR FISHING, SHORELINE, AND WHITE WATER ACTIVITIES q
. i.:,
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For instream flow increases, economic theory suggests that the
total willingness to pay should increase at an increasing rate, con-
tinue to increase at a decreasing rate up to some peak, then, finally,
decrease. This relationship modeled the bid functions for fishing and
shoreline activities. A quadratic regression equation, including the
variables Flow and (Flow)2, seemed to perform best. White water rec-
reationist models didn't follow the pattern; total willingness to pay
increased over all instream flow quantity increases. The best white
water statistical equation modeled a linear total bid function.
According to the statistic, [2, all statistical equations fit the
cross section data reasonably well. Fishing entrance fee and sales tax
models explained 41 and 43 percent of the variation in household
willingness-to-pay responses. Shoreline entrance fee and sales tax
models explained 52 and 50 percent of the bid variation. And, the ~
for white water entrance fee and shoreline models was .52 and .66,
respectively. Note, model comparison by ~ is not strictly appropri-
ate, since the regression equations include different independent
variables.
Instream flow quantity variables are the principle determinant
of fishing and white water willingness-to-pay responses. According to
statistical t-ratio tests, variables, Flow and (Flow)2 are significant
(t-ratios equal to 3:58 and 5.78 in the entrance fee fishing model).
They also explain 20 and 21 percent of household fishing bid varia-
tions. Flow, alone, is highly significant in the white water model
(t-ratios equal to 21.68 and 15.05 in the entrance fee and sales tax
models), and it explains 38 and 53 percent of the bid variation. Even
though Flow and (F1ow)2 were significant (t-ratios equal to 2.18 and
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2.61) in the shoreline user models, they could explain only 3 and 6
percent of the bid variation. Tables 4-2 through 4-7 summarize the
statistical parameter estimated for flow and the other important eco-
nomic variables.
2. AGGREGATE INSTREAM FLOW MARGINAL VALUES
Before water managers can make formal water policy decisions
concerning incremental instream flow changes, they need specific
information about marginal instream values rather than the total value.
The necessary aggregate marginal schedules exhibited rational economic
behavior (see page 72 for the aggregation procedures). The fishing
instream flow marginal benefit function slopes downward to the right.
Each unit flow increase has a value less than the previous one. If the
Poudre River's flow is small (50 cfs) fishing marginal instream value
is relatively large ($26.38/cfs and $36.59/cfs for the entrance fee and
sales tax games). The marginal value falls to zero as instream flows
approach 500 cfs. This economic point corresponds closely with the
physical fishery model showing that an optimal stream flow for catching
trout in the Poudre River occurs at approximately 500 cfs (see Table
~8). Fishermen, without complex fishing and hydrologic models
know which flow level provides the best fishing. Beyond 500 cfs the
quality of the Poudre River fishery decreases. The economic values
confirm that result, as fishermen would not pay for instream flow addi-
tions past 500 cfs.
Like the fishing marginal function, shoreline marginal values
decrease as flow quantities increase, turning negative when the Poudre
River flow exceeds 700 cfs. But, the starting magnitude is much
smaller and the rate of decrease continues over higher flow rates. As
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long as the Poudre River isn't dry or over bank full, the shoreline
recreationist is relatively indifferent between alternative instream
flow levels. Because the variance around the bids is so great, none
of the marginal values are statistically different from zero (see
Tabl e 4-9).
White water marginal functions are slightly different. Total
willingness to pay increases at a constant rate over all instream flow
quantity changes in the photographs. Thus, the first derivative (mar-
ginal benefit) is a constant. Each instream flow cfs increase is worth
$9.55 and $14.40 in the entrance fee and sales tax game, respectively.
Had the survey been able to include photographs showing the Poudre
River at extremely high flow rates, producing a river that is dangerous
to kayak, the resulting white water marginal benefit function would
have resembled the other two functions (see Table 4-10).
Some analysts criticize bidding game approaches because of the
inherent hypothetical market structure. Indeed, respondents may not
reveal their true preferences for instream flows. Peter Bohm suggested
that, since any hypothetical situation may result in bias, the research
design should include at least two different willingness-to-pay games. 5
If individuals are going to give false responses, one game should
encourage understatement, the other overstatement of true preferences.
The interval between the two benefit functions will be small or large
depending on how strongly individuals respond to the specific incen-
tives built into each question design.
The bids for all recreation activities were statistically differ-
ent for each repayment obligation. Sales tax marginal benefit values
5Sohm , "Estimating Access Values," Ope cit.
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always exceeded entrance fee marginal benefits. The entrance game
forcing recreationists to pay their stated valuation may encourage
understatement. Some users may believe the State will provide more
flow regardless of the willingness-to-pay responses. The sales tax
game might provide incentives for overstatement, since the payment is
not related to the amount of use. Generally, recreationists using the
Poudre River have an incentive to overstate their valuations in order
to increase the instream flow at the expense of the general public.
This logic does assume that users have mean valuations that exceed
society's mean valuation. This study produced sales tax responses
approximately $10.00 greater for fishing activities, approximately
$4.00 greater for shoreline activities, and approximately $5.00 greater
for white water activities at each instream flow rate.
3. OPTIMAL INSTREAM FLOW RESOURCES ALLOCATION BETWEEN FISHING AND
IRRIGATION ACTIVITIES
The static economic theory of optimal resource allocation shows
the conditions for an efficient instream flow allocation. To fulfill
the efficiency condition, water resource managers should allocate
instream flows into supplementary and complementary activities until
further reallocation causes the activities to compete for more instream
flow. Once competitive, he should allocate stream flow between uses so
that the marginal return from each use is equal.
During May, June, and July fishing and irrigation are complemen-
tary outputs. Because the average Poudre River stream flow exceeds 450
cfs (775, 1,542, and 703 cfs, respectively), increased irrigation
diversions will increase crop output and increase fishing social bene-
fits by at least $4.26/af, $2.19/af, and $12.81/af (see Table 4-8).
12]
In October, fishing and irrigation become supplementary outputs. Leav-
ing water in the River increases fishing benefits by $6.79/af (average
flow in October is 124 cfs), without reducing any crop output that same
season. Pareto efficiency calls for increased irrigation diversion in
early summer and no diversion after September.
As fishing and irrigation become competitive in September,
instream flow water allocation decision becomes more difficult; reallo-
cating flow increases one output at the expense of the other. Current
September allocation may be inefficient. Since the average stream flow
is only 105 cfs, the marginal return to fishing activities, $10.54/af,
exceeds the marginal return for crop irrigation, $7.22/af. To maximize
net social benefits, the Poudre River instream flow should be 200 cfs
where marginal returns in both uses are approximately equal (7.68/af
for fishing and $7.27/af in c~op production).
One possible solution involves changing the timing of irrigation
water storage in high mountain and plains reservoirs. Many irrigation
companies begin filling high mountain reservoirs in the fall and wait
until next spring to fill reservoirs on the plains. 6 Changing the
storage timing between high mountain and plains reservoirs turns a com-
petitive relationship into a complementary one. Fishing benefits
increase by $lO/af in the fall as more water runs downstream into
plains reservoirs, and benefits increase in the spring as high mountain
storage reduces early summer instream flow. The change in storage
timing substantially increases total benefits. In September, the addi-
tional flow increases recreation benefits by $330/day or approximately
$10,000. In October, total benefits increase by $11,000. This water
6Aukerman, Springer, and Judge, Ope cit.
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right storage timing exchange increases social fishing benefits without
decreasing water for irrigation. (Note, all seepage and evaporation
losses must be accounted for.)
4. FUTURE INSTREAM FLOW VALUES
Static economic analysis is correct, only if today's water alloca-
tion doesn't effect future instream flow quantities or future consump-
tion benefits. Generally, irrigation diversions in the Poudre River
don't involve intertemporal problems. But, water for instream recrea-
tion might change future consumption behavior. 7 More instream flows
improve the Poudre River's fishers, and makes fishing activities more
accessible. After seeing how much enjoyment fishermen have, shorelin-
ers might take up fishing. Instream flow maintenance for fishing,
also, provides an opportunity to increase fishing skills. Both
improved fishing skill, and recreation shifts from shoreline to fishing
activities, increase instream flow benefits. Resource managers should
consider these possible future instream flow benefit increases in their
reallocation decisions.
Intertemporal decisions involving irreversible changes in the
environment are even more complex. For example, the decision to con-
struct a storage reservoir on the Poudre River results in a permanent
benefit loss from free-flowing stream recreation. Krutilla and Fisher
have shown that when development benefits grow more slowly than pres-
ervation benefits, the decision to preserve is optimal. 8 Assuming no
congestion, recreation fishing benefits are growing at 8 percent/year
7Cicchetti, seneca, and Davidson, op. cit.
8Krutilla and Fisher, op. cit.
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in real terms (see Table 5-3). The decision to construct a reservoir
must account for this growth rate.
5. LEGAL AND ECONOMIC INTERRELATIONSHIPS
R. H. Coase presented an analysis implying that economic negotia-
tions between irrigators and fishermen will generate optimal instream
flow allocations regardless of the property right ownership.9 However,
the instream allocation problem violates the Coasian assumptions.
Since instream flow for fishing is a public good; numerous fishermen
have an interest in the allocation. The transactions costs to collect
all the fishermen preferences, alone, prevents Coasian neutrality. In
addition, the fisherman may have non-unique benefit functions. Prop-
erty rights that force the fisherman to buy water rights from irriga-
tors impose.'an income constraint on their willingness to pay. If
fishermen own the rights to instream flow, each would have a recreation
price to sell (willingness to accept compensation) that income doesn't
constrain.
The legal institution allocating Colorado's stream flow resources
is the appropriation doctrine. This allocation system distributes
water according to beneficial use and priority. If appropriations on a
stream exceed water supplies, then the application data determines how
much water the right owner will receive. Senior appropriators having
the earliest application dates divert water first, followed by junior
appropriators having later application dates.
The appropriation doctrine establishes a full property rule.
Fishermen, wanting higher instream flow levels can either pursuade
irrigation companies, who have rights to virtually all the Poudre River
9Coase, op. cit.
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stream flow, to divert less or they can purchase water rights. Prop-
erty rules combined with economic markets function efficiently if
interested parties can meet before the transaction. Colorado has a
quasi-market exchange systems between irrigators, but the market
doesn't aid allocations between recreationists and irrigators where
numerous individuals have an interest in the public goods aspect of
instream flows. Without different property right rules or some other
economic mechanism to transfer water rights to uses having the highest
water return, allocations according to the doctrine of appropriation
sacrifice economic efficiency and equity to assure legal security for
senior water right owners.
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APPENDIX A
MINIMUM FLOW OPINION SURVEY
Department of Economics
Colorado State University
Fort Collins, Colorado 80523
Good Morning/Afternoon. I'm collecting information concerning the
importance of minimum water flows in the Poudre River. Minimum flow
regulations may have significant impacts on the current uses of the
Poudre River. For example, requiring a specific level of water would
enhance stream recreation but might reduce the water available for crop
irrigation during the growing season. This research examines some of
the trade-offs between farm, municipal, and recreational uses of stream
flow. With these objectives in mind, I would like to ask you a few
questions to see how you value various water quantities in the Poudre
River.
1. When using the Poudre River for your recreational purposes, which
activity do you enjoy most? Please rank recreation activities in
order of your preference.
____ Fishing Rafting and kayaking----
____ Shorel ine activities (picnicking, camping, hiking,
viewing, etc.)
2. How many days in the last 12 months would you estimate that you













3. How many years have you been traveling into the Poudre Canyon to
participate in activities? years
I have some additional questions which will help detennine your
value (in dollar terms) of different water flows in the River.
The photographs I have show how the Poudre River looks with vari-
ous stream flows. Each flow level provides a somewhat different
experience.----
137
4. Would you please look at these four sets of photographs at differ-
ent sites of the Poudre River and rank the sites in order of your
preference:
1st 2nd 3rd 4th----
5. Would you please use the photographs to rank the different flow
levels at site in order of your preference: 1st
2nd 3rd 4th 5th ----
I noticed that the type of stream recreation you prefer is
Suppose that you were going to use the Poudre River
to for day(s) of annual use. Assume also that a
local governmental agency collected an annual district recrea-
tional sales tax to finance the provision of different stream
flows for your enjoyment. This annual tax is the only
way to finance the program. All area residents and visitors to
the Poudre River recreation district would pay the annual sales
tax. This sales tax will permit use for all members of your
household going for day(s) of annual use.
6. How do you expect to pay for the added cost?
1 - I expect my income to increase (by how much %)----
2 - I will work extra hours (no. of additional hours---- )
3 - I will purchase less of other goods----
4 - I will save less----
5 - Other (explain)----
7. Would you be willing to add %increase to present sales
taxes, if that resulted in stream flow increases from those in
picture 1 to those in picture 2?
8. (If any bid = zero, choose one.) Did you answer zero because:
1. You do not receive any benefits from additional water flows;
therefore, you see no reason for the extra sales tax.
2. Sales taxes are already too high.
3. Other.
I would like to playa somewhat different bidding game with you.
Assume that to gain access to the Poudre River Canyon to _
for day(s) of annual use all users must pay a daily entrance
fee. All of this daily fee would be used to provide the best
stream flow for your enjoyment. This daily fee is the
only way of financing the various water quantities in the photo-
graphs. All users will pay the same fee as you do. This fee will
permit use for all members of your household going for
day(s) of annual use. Also, assume that participation in--
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at any other river canyon would require payment of an---:-----=-entrance fee.
9. Would you please rank the photographs of different flow levels at
site in order of your preference. 1st 2nd
3rd 4th 5th ------
10. If the entrance fee cost $ /day would you pay the fee so the
members of your household could travel up the Poudre River Canyon
to for day(s) of annual use, if that amount
resulted in an increase in water flow in picture 1 to those in
picture 2?
11. (If any bid = zero, choose one.) Did you answer zero because:
1. You do not receive any benefits from additional water flows.
2. You believe that it is unfair to charge access to public prop-
erty.
3. Other.
(Play entrance fee bidding game for third site.)
12. Would you please rank the photographs of different flow levels at
site in order of your preference? 1st 2nd ___
3rd 4th 5th------
13. Play Entry Fee Bidding Game.
14. Show individual his bid matrices. Would you like to change any
bids? (If there are substantial differences between
the sales tax bids and the entrance fees, ask why.)
1 - You do not like the idea of an entrance fee to a------ public canyon.
2 - You do not like the idea of increasing sales taxes.------




























16. Do you live in the Fort Collins area?
(If yes) How long have you lived in th~is---a-rea? years
(If no) Where do you live city For how many years?
17. How would you classify your previous residence?
1. very large city (100,000+)
2. medium-size city (25,000-100,000)
3. small city (5,000-25,000)
4. rural area or town (non-farm)
5. farm
6. have always lived at current residence
18. How many individuals do you have living in your home? --
19. How many of the individuals living at home in Question 15 would
participate in with you? no.
20. Please circle the highest level of schooling you completed
Elementary 12345678
High school or vocational school 9 10 11 12
College or technical school
Graduate training
13 14 15 16
17 18 19 20 21 22
21. If you don't object, could you indicate which of the following












The purpose of the water surface profile computer program is to
predict the depths and velocities at a stream cross section, given
various discharge rates. There are several possible approaches:
Manning's equation, stage-discharge relationships, and combinations of
both. Each differ primarily with respect to the number of discharge
measurements the researcher needs to calibrate the hydrologic simula-
tion program. This thesis used the single discharge measurement cali-
bration method required by the Manning's equation approach. Since it
requires only one field survey, there are considerable cost and time
savings. The cost savings do, however, cause a decrease in accuracy.
Since the reason behind predicting river profiles is to provide the
respondent with additional, but approximate, information about the
river at each site and not for legal use to set minimum flows, the cost
savings dominated the accuracy considerations.
At anyone river cross section Manning's equation can be written
Q = 1.49 S 1/2 AR2/ 3
n e
lRobert R. Milhous and Ken D. Bovee, Theoretical Considerations
Necessary for Predicting Discharge, Stage, and Velocity from Measure-
ments of Natural Streams for Instream Flow Assessments, Cooperative




Q = discharge in CFS
A = cross section area in ft2
R = the hydrologic radius
Se = energy grade line or slope
n = calibration coefficient of channel roughness.
Using only one measurement of discharge, stage, and the proper
calibration of n, the water surface profile program can calculate dis-
charge, velocity, and depth at other stages. Note that since n varies
with discharge, Manning's equation can predict profiles at stages
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Source: Ken D. Bovee, Probability-of-Use Criteria for the Family
Sa1monidae, Cooperative Instream Flow Service Group, Fort




Table C-l. Available Weighted Usable Surface Area (WUSA) Per 1000





Juveni1es l Adults 2
(WUSA in sq. ft.)
Brown Life Stages
Juveniles l Adults2


























lTrout between 2" and 8".
2Trout over 811 •
Table C-2. Available Weighted Usable Surface Area (WUSA) Per 1000






(WUSA in sq. ft.)
Brown Life Stages
Juveniles 1 Adults 2


























lTrout between 2" and 811 •




Table C-3. Available Weighted Usable Surface Area (WUSA) Per 1000





Juveniles 1 Adults 2
(WUSA in sq. ft.)
Brown Life Stages
Juveniles1 Adults 2































1Trout between 2" and 8".
2Trout over 8".
Table C-4. Available Weighted Usable Surface Area (WUSA) per 1000





Juveni1es l Adu1ts 2
(WUSA in sq. ft.)
Brown Life Stages
Juveni1es1 Adults2































lTrout between 211 and 8".
2Trout over 8".
APPENDIX D
This appendix presents alternative total willingness-to-pay model
formulations. All models included the variables Flow; total activity
days in the Poudre River Canyon, activity days in other river canyons,
years of experience, and income. Each successive model added other
independent taste and preference parameters.
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Table 9-1. Ordinary Least-Square Equation Estimates of Total
1978.AWillingness to Pay Entrance Fee, Fishing Activity,
Model
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
a 15.40 -1 .31 -.58 2.31 2.14
(14.38 ) (1 .23) (.50) (1 .57) (1.55 )
Flow 9.21 .21 .16 .14 .1295
(Flow)2
(16.02) (11 .06) (9.38) (8.71) (3.55)
-.36 E-3 -.37 E-3 -.14 E-3 -. 138 E-3
(Flow)3
(13.40 ) (11.92) (7.84) (5.28)
TO .17 -.64 -.51 0.33 - .13
(TO)2
(3.85) (14.17) (9.98) (8.42) (5.97)
.76 E-2 -.78 E-2 .48 E-2 .21 E-2
(11 .84) (12.29 ) (10.01 ) (3.21 )
SUB -.22
(4.10)
Year .67 E-l .49 E-l .012 .043








Site(i) .52(2) .84(2) .36(2)
















.24 .33 .34 .40 .41
F 9.48 20.27 21.48 25.62 26.98
ANumber in parentheses below each coefficient represents student
t-ratios for the null hypothesis.
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Table ~2. Ordinary Least-Square Equation Estimates of Total
Willingness to Pay Sales Tax Game, Fishing Activity, 1978.A
Model
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
ct 22.08 -4.82 .94 2.63 3. 11
(12.32) (2.62) (1 .97) (l .53) (1.31)
Flow -.89 .21 .20 .18 .1761
(F1ow)2
(l2.01) (9.48) (6.48) (3.92) (4.65)
-.42 E-3 -.23 E-3 -.16 E-3 -.1563E-3
(F1ow)3
(6.84) (8.94) (6.23) (5.78)
TD .24 -.29 -.33 -.25 -. 18
(TD)2
(3.42) (4.32) (6.32) (5.78) (6.79)
.35 E-2 .42 E-2 .37 E-2 .28 E-2
(4.92) (4.32) (4.62) (3.60)
SUB -.89
(3.12)
Year .41 E-1 .36 E-1 .38 E-1 .33 E-1 .28 E-1
(3.98) (3.42) (2.62) (2.72) (2.15)
IN .09 .17 .15 .13
(IN)2




















-2 (5.14)R .22 .31 .34 .42 .43
F 10.43 18.42 20. 12 27.32 29.01
ANumbers in parentheses below each coefficient represent student
t-ratios for the null hypothesis.
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Table D-3. Ordinary Least-Square Equation Estimates of Total WillinR-
ness to Pay Entrance Fee Game, Shoreline Activity, 1978.
Model
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
a 10.32 4.64 7.62 2.23 1.40
(8.32) (3.32) (l .92) (2.42) (.34)
Flow 1.42 E-1 .43 E-1 .23 E-l .16 E-1 .1485 E-l
(F1ow)2
(2.79) (2.83) (2.47) (2.21 ) (2.29)
- .18 E-4 -. 16 E-4 - .11 E-4 -.1045 E-4
(F1ow)3
(2.18) (2.52) (2.35) (2.18)
TO -.42 .18 .22 .18 .20
(TO)2
(7.82) (6.42) (5.47) (6.01) (5.30)
-. 14 E-l -.52 E-2 -.67 E-2 -.97 E-2
(5.32) (3.42) (2.97) (2.48)
SUB -.49 E-l -.38 E-l .41 E-1
(4.32) (2.42) (3.04)
Year -.28 -.37 .26 .17 - .10
(6.72) (7.42) (6.32) (6.11) (6.02)
IN -.32 E-1 -.92 E-l -.97 E-l -.72 E-l -.86 E-1
(IN)2
(2.62) (2.46) (3.42) (4.36) (6.00)
AGE .70 E-l .66 E-1
(7.32) (6.13)
SEX .82 1.02 .32
(6.42) (7.32) (3.47)
EO -.46 -.53 -.33 -.28

















-2 (5.26)R . 11 .36 .37 .50 .52
F 8.82 12.42 13.04 20.01 24.68
ANumbers in parentheses below each coefficient represent the student
t-ratios for the null hypothesis.
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Table D-4. Ordinary Least-Square Equation Estimates of Total Willing-
ness to Pay Sales Tax Game, Shoreline Activity, 1978.A
Model
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
a. 7.38 2.02 2.52 2.00 1.25
(7.36) (1 .79) (3.20) (5.62) (4.94)
Flow .88 E-l .21 E-1 .19 E-l .18 E-l .178 E-l
(Flow)2
(2.38) (3.36) (2.42) (3.32) (2.61 )
- .14 E-4 - .15 E-4 -.13 E-4 -1.375 E-4
(Flow)3
(3.78) (2.52) (2.32) (2.56)
TO .13 .17 .19 .24
(TO)2
(6.06) (7.04) (6.43) (5.06)
-.43 E-2 -.51 E-2 -.62 E-2 -.54 E-2
(5.43) (3.46) (3.94) (3.94)
SUB -. 16
(5.32)
Year -.64 E-l -.67 .24 -.21 - .19
(4.88) (4.71 ) (6.42) (5.78) (5.23)
IN -.23 E-1 .52 E-1 -.77 E-l -.83 E-1 -.75 E-1
(IN)2
























.19 .35 .36 .47 .50
F 23.36 38.37 38.52 52.06 54.21
AN umber ;n parenthesis below each coefficient represents the student
t-ratios for the null hypothesis.
